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A

CALIFORNIA COURT of appeal has decisively upheld the constitutionality of inclusionary zoning-a program that in the past twentyfive years has housed over 50,000 low- and moderate-income families'
in new homes that they would otherwise have been unable to afford.
Inclusionary zoning requires a developer of new residences to make a
certain percentage of its homes available to low- and/or moderate-
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1. In California, very low-income families are defined as those earning less than 50%
of the median income in a Metropolitan Statistical Area ("MSA"), see CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 50105 (West 1996); lower income families as those earning less than 80% of
the median family income, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 50079.5 (West 1996); and
moderate-income families as those earning less than 120% of the median family income,
see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 50093 (West 1996 & Supp. 2002). Incomes vary widely by
county and MSA. See CAL. DEer. OF Hous. & CMTY. DEV., MEMORANDUM: INCOME LIMITS
PURSUANT TO TITLE 25, § 6932 CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS (CCR) (2002), available
at http://www.hcd.ca.gov/hpd/hrc/rep/state/inc2k2.pdf (last visited July 15, 2002). In
Oakland, California, for instance, a three-person, very low income family earns less than
$33,550 per year, while in Fresno, California, the same family earns less than $18,150 per
year. In Oakland, a lower income three-person family earns less than $52,200 per year,
while a moderate-income family earns less than $80,450 per year. See id. In NewJersey, "low
income" conforms with California's very low income category, while "moderate income"
corresponds to California's low income category. See Nico Calavita et al., Inclusionary Housing in California and New Jersey: A Comparative Analysis, 8 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 109, 116
(1997).
*
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income households at an affordable price.2 In Home Builders Ass'n v.
4
City of Napa,3 Napa's inclusionary zoning withstood a major takings
challenge mounted by the Home Builders Association of Northern
California ("HBA") and the Pacific Legal Foundation, both leaders in
the property rights movement. 5 The California Supreme Court and
the United States Supreme Court have denied certiorari, and thus local governments can continue to use inclusionary zoning as an effective tool to provide affordable housing.
Inclusionary zoning ordinances are used extensively in California,
New Jersey, and Montgomery County, Maryland, 6 and sporadically
elsewhere. 7 They were instituted as a response to suburban zoning
policies that tended to exclude low-income residents ("exclusionary
2. See Laura M. Padilla, Reflections on Inclusionary Housing and a Renewed Look at its
Viability, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 539, 540 (1995); Marc T. Smith et al., Inclusionary Housing
Programs:Issues and Outcomes, 25 REAL EST. L.J. 155 (1996). In this Comment, "inclusionary
housing" and "inclusionary zoning" are used interchangeably. "Inclusionary housing" as
used here is sometimes called a "mandatory set-aside." See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE
LAw § 7.26, at 324-25 (4th ed. 1997). "Inclusionary zoning" may also mean any method
used to create more affordable housing in a community, which may include zoning for
high-density apartments, reduced development standards, and other approaches. See id.
§ 7.25, at 323; Stuart Meck et al., Zoning and Subdivision Regulations, in THE PRACTICE OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING

343, 360 (Charles J. Hoch et al. eds., 3d ed. 2000). For

discussions of a variety of inclusionary techniques used to promote affordable housing, see
generally Jennifer M. Morgan, Comment, Zoning for All: Using Inclusionary Zoning Techniques
to Promote Affordable Housing, 44 EMORY L.J. 359 (1995); Marc Settles, The Perpetuation of
Residential Racial Segregation in America: Historical Discrimination, Modern Forms of Exclusion,
and Inclusionary Remedies, 14J. LAND USE & ENrL. LAw 89 (1998). The inclusionary zoning
reviewed here also does not include that required within redevelopment areas (such as the
requirements of California's Community Redevelopment Law). See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 33000 (West 1999). The legal bases for these requirements relate to the financing
mechanisms used within redevelopment areas and so are substantially different from those
discussed here.
3. 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60 (Ct. App. 2001), review denied, Sept. 12, 2001 (2001 Cal. Lexis
6166), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1356 (2002).
4. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
5. See Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A CriticalAnalysis
and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509, 540-42, 545 (1998).
6. See Smith et al., supra note 2, at 157-58; Florence Wagman Roisman, Opening the
Suburbs to Racial Integration: Lessons for the 21st Century, 23 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 65, 71
(2001).
7. Communities in Massachusetts have created approximately 1,000 affordable units
through various kinds of "affordability zoning," some of which is mandatory. See Philip B.

Herr, ZoningforAffordability in Massachusetts:An Overview, in INCLUSIONARY

ZONING: LESSONS

NHC AFFORDABLE HOUSING POL'Y REV. 3-4 (Jan. 2002). Other
communities with inclusionary ordinances include Boulder and Telluride, Colorado, and
Fairfax County, Virginia. See BOULDER, COLO. REV. CODE § 9-6.5 (2000), available at http://
www.ci.boulder.co.us/clerk/previous/2001/010102/11.html (last accessed Apr. 19, 2002);
TELLURIDE, CoLo., LAND USE CODE Div. 7 AFFORDABLE HOUSING REQUIREMENTS § 3-710
LEARNED IN MASSACHUSETTS,
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zoning"),8 to severe shortages of affordable housing combined with a
reduction of federal housing subsidies, 9 and to legal pressures in California and NewJersey. 10 Policymakers and citizens in areas as diverse
as Brookline, Massachusetts, 11 Chicago, Illinois, 12 Leon County, Florida, 13 Denver, Colorado, 14 and Madison, Wisconsin, 15 continue to promote inclusionary zoning as a way to solve shortages of affordable
housing.
An inclusionary program works like this: A developer proposes to
build a new subdivision, called Sweetbriar, in Suburbia Ritz, USA. The
developer plans 100 homes and 100 apartments. Suburbia requires
that ten percent of all new homes be sold at prices affordable to moderate-income families and that ten percent of all new apartments be
rented at prices affordable to lower income families (the affordable
units are sometimes called "inclusionary units"). While the market
price of the new homes is $500,000, requiring an annual income of
$144,000,16 the ten inclusionary homes are sold to moderate-income
families earning a maximum of $89,400 per year, for $308,000.17 Similarly, while the market rent of the luxury two-bedroom apartments is
$2,135 per month, requiring an annual income of $85,400,18 the ten
inclusionary apartments are rented to lower income families, who
earn a maximum of $46,400 per year, for $894 per month. Suburbia
7
(2001), available at http://www.town.telluride.co.us/plan/landuse/art3div .html (last accessed May 31, 2002); and FAIRFAX COUNTY, VA., ZONING ORD.§ 2-800 (1998).
8. See MANDELKER, supra note 2,§ 7.01 at 303-04; Meck, supra note 2, at 355-56.

See Richard A. Judd & David Paul Rosen, Inclusionay Housingin California: Creating
AFFORDABLE Hous. & COMMUNITV DEV. L. 4 (1992).
10. See Calavita et al., supra note 1, at 135.
11. See Joe Warner, Deal Aims To Keep All Happy-And In Town, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
28, 2002, at 12.
12. See Cindy Richards, Who'll defend real pioneers? Nothing short of city's intervention will
protect long time, low-income residents of gentrifying neighborhoods, CHICAGO SuN-TIMES, May 15,
2002, at 43.
13. See Steve Hollister, Home Search-Affordable Housing in East Manatee. East Manatee
Communities Need Workers, But Most Can't Afford to Live There, BRADENTON HERALD, Apr. 7,
2002, at IA; available at http://www.bradenton.com/mld/bradenton/archives/.
14. See Peter Blake, At City Council, Son Lobbies Mom, RocKV MTN. NEWS, Feb. 6, 2002, at
33A.
15. See Nino Amato, Race, Housing, Taxes, Life: There's Much Still Undone, CAP. TIMES,
Feb. 28, 2002, at 1 A.
9.

Affordability Without Public Subsidy, 2J.

16. Assuming 10% down, an interest rate of 7%, and 30% of income paid for housing.
17. Affordable sales prices are based on a complex set of assumptions that include
down payment, interest rate, homeowners association payments, and utility costs. This calculation is based on those developed by the City of San Mateo. See SAN MATEO, CAL., BELOW
MARKET RATE (INCLUSIONARY)
MUM UNIT RATES

PROGRAM, BELOW MARKET RATE HOUSING PROGRAM MAXI-

(Feb. 2002).

18. Assuming that 30% of monthly income is used for housing.
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controls the resale price of the homes and rent increases in the apartments so that they remain affordable for at least fifty years. The net
effect is that twenty families are able to live in Sweetbriar who could
not otherwise have done so. The families are happy, as is Suburbia,
which created affordable housing at no public cost. However, the developer finds himself with $1,920,000 less in proceeds from sales
(3.8% less than the $50 million he would otherwise receive) and with
$12,410 less per month in rent (5.8% less than the $213,500 he would
otherwise receive).
A program that so clearly reduces developers' incomes while subsidizing low-income households can be expected to be controversial.
While inclusionary zoning is not used widely when viewed on a national basis, it has attracted significant hostile commentary, 19 balanced
by equally strong support. 20 Opponents argue that cities have created
a housing shortage through their exclusionary policies and then, to
solve the problem, have forced developers to subsidize affordable
housing, rather than changing their own policies. 21 Worse, opponents
argue, inclusionary zoning actually reduces the supply of affordable
housing in the long run. 2 Proponents counter that inclusionary zoning merely corrects suburban exclusionary zoning that artificially
raises prices. 23 Most importantly, they argue, mandatory inclusionary

19. For articles hostile to inclusionary zoning, see generally Lawrence Berger, Inclusionary Zoning Devices as Takings: The Legacy of the Mount Laurel Cases, 70 NEB. L. REv. 186 (1991)
(defining inclusionary zoning as a taking and as a self-defeating measure adopted by cities
to correct self-created housing shortages); Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary"
Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1167 (1981) (concluding that inclusionary zoning aggravates
housing shortages rather than correcting them and consequently is another form of exclusionary zoning).
20. For articles supportive of inclusionary zoning, see generally Andrew G. Dietderich,
An Egalitarian'sMarket: The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
23 (1996) (criticizing Ellickson and concluding that inclusionary zoning will increase the
supply of affordable housing); William W. Merrill III& Robert K Lincoln, Linkage Fees and
Fair Share Regulations: Law and Method, 25 URB. LAW. 223 (1993) (stating that inclusionary
programs can pass legal tests if designed after appropriate studies and with procedural
safeguards); Padilla, supranote 2 (finding that inclusionary programs are viable and legally
valid).
21. See Berger, supra note 19, at 227-28. For a sound bite analysis, see City Creates Housing Shortage and Makes Private Property Owners Pay, PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, at http://
www.pacificlegal.org/libertywatch/lw-octl.htm#HBA%20of%20N.%20CA (last visited Mar.
23, 2002) [hereinafter Housing Shortage].
22. See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1215-16, 1270.
23. See Dietderich, supra note 20, at 25-26; Daniel R. Mandelker, The Constitutionality
of Inclusionary Zoning: An Overview, in INCLUSIONARY ZONING MOVEs DOWNTOWN 31, 33-34
(Dwight Merriam et al. eds., 1985).
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zoning creates more affordable housing than any voluntary
24
program.
These contrary policy views are reflected in a legal debate about
how inclusionary ordinances should be characterized. Since the early
197 0s, commentators have argued variously that inclusionary zoning is
an "exaction," or that it is a rent and price control, or that it is just a
run-of-the-mill land use ordinance akin to traditional zoning district
regulations. 2 5 How the ordinance is viewed is critical in determining
whether it will be upheld by the courts. The rigor of the constitutional
scrutiny applied depends on this characterization.
Suburbia's ordinance illustrates how an inclusionary ordinance
may be viewed as any one of the three alternatives. "Exactions" are
requirements imposed by public entities as a condition to development of property. 26 They include dedications of property, installation
of public improvements, and monetary fees of various kinds. From the
developer's viewpoint, Suburbia's inclusionary ordinance is certainly
an exaction: it requires a public benefit in exchange for the right to
develop, not different from a requirement to build a road, install a
sewage line, or donate a park. From the developer's viewpoint, the
ordinance is also a price control; it controls the prices and rents that
may be charged for his homes and apartment. Suburbia, however,
views it as merely another land use ordinance that controls the use of
a small amount of the developer's property-no different from a requirement for a large front yard.

24. See Gregory Mellon Fox & Barbara Rosenfeld Davis, Density Bonus Zoning to Provide
and Low and Moderate Cost Housing,3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1015, 1067 (1976); Herr, supra
note 7, at 4; Sam Stonefield, Affordable Housing in Suburbia: The Importance But Limited Effectiveness of the State Override Tool, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 323, 343 (2001); Clark Ziegler,
Introduction, INCLUSIONARY ZONING: LESSONS LEARNED IN MASSACHUSETFS, 2 NHC AFFORDABLE HOUSING POL'Y REv. 1-2 (Jan. 2002).
25. See Thomas Kleven, Inclusionay Ordinances-Policy and Legal Issues in RequiringPrivate Developers to Build Low Cost Housing, 21 UCLA L. REv. 1432, 1490 (1974). See also Fred P.
Bosselman et al., Panel Comments, in INCLUSIONARY ZONING MovEs DOWNTOWN 41-54

(Dwight Merriam et al. eds., 1985); Mandelker, supra note 23, at 35-36; Merrill & Lincoln,
supra note 20, at 274. On the other hand, many commentators simply assume that inclusionary housing is an exaction. See Berger, supra note 19, at 221; Brian W. Blaesser, Inclusionary Housing: There's a Better Way, INCLUSIONARY ZONING: LESSONS LEARNED IN
MASSACHUSETTS, 2 NHC AFFORDABLE HOUSING POL'Y REV. 14, 15 (Jan. 2002); Susan M.
Denbo, Development Exactions: A New Way to Fund State and Local Government Infrastructure
Improvements and Affordable Housing,23 REAL ESTATE L.J. 7, 11 (1994); Ellickson, supra note
19, at 1211.
26. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.32, at
675 (3d ed. 2000).
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In general, courts are far more deferential to land use controls
than they are to exactions. 27 Both of the appellate court decisions upholding inclusionary zoning 28 viewed it as a land use control. Courts
are also deferential in their constitutional scrutiny of rent and price
control ordinances.2 9 However, state statutes may strictly limit local
rent control.30 If inclusionary ordinances are held to be rent control
ordinances, they may be struck down as a violation of state law. 31
City of Napa32 is significant because it is the first appellate court
decision reviewing the constitutionality of inclusionary zoning following the United States Supreme Court's formulation of its current takings doctrine in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission33 and Dolan v.
City of Tigard.34 In these two cases, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of exactions applied to new development: a required

public access easement in Nollan35 and a floodplain and pedestrian/
bicycle easement in Dolan.3 6 With these two cases, the Court established an intermediate scrutiny test requiring that there be an "essential nexus"37 between the government's interest and the exaction, and

"rough proportionality" 38 between the impact of the development and
the extent of the exaction. The court in City of Napa resolved that, in

California, an inclusionary ordinance is not subject to the Nollan/Dolan
test and reviewed Napa's ordinance under a deferential land use regulation standard.3 9 However, the decision did not entirely foreclose
27. See discussion infra Part II.
28. See Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60 (Ct. App. 2001);
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J.
1983) ("Mt. Laurel II").
29. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
30. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1954.50-.535 (2001) (requiring decontrol of prices when
tenants vacate and establishing other restrictions on local rent control ordinances); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 38-12-301 (2001) (prohibiting local rent control except on property in which
a local agency has an interest); discussion infta Part IV.D.
31. See Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30, 35 (Colo.
2000) (holding that Telluride's inclusionary ordinance violated Colorado's ban on local
rent control). See generally Nadia I. El Mallakh, Comment, Does the Costa-HawkinsAct Prohibit
Local Inclusionary Zoning Programs?89 CAL. L. REv. 1847 (2001) (discussing potential conflicts between California's rent control laws and inclusionary housing programs).
32. 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60.
33. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
34. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
35. See 483 U.S. at 827.
36. See 512 U.S. at 380.
37. 483 U.S. at 837.
38. 512 U.S. at 391.
39. See Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 66 (Ct. App. 2001).
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scrutiny of inclusionary ordinances as either exactions or rent control
ordinances.
Part I of this Comment describes the development of inclusionary
zoning and reviews the policy debates. It concludes that, in a setting
where housing supply is constrained by local zoning, inclusionary programs are a fair and reasonable way to provide affordable housing.
Part II describes the legal standards applicable to review of land use
regulations as opposed to exactions and discusses unresolved constitutional issues. Part III presents City of Napa and analyzes its likely impact on future takings challenges to inclusionary ordinances. Part IV
reviews the legal issues involved when an inclusionary ordinance is
considered to be a rent or price control. Part V discusses features that
should be incorporated into inclusionary ordinances to withstand a
constitutional challenge. In particular, it concludes that most inclusionary ordinances, as now drafted, can be viewed as either exactions or
land use ordinances and that cities may be in a stronger legal position
if they draft their ordinances to more clearly reflect one, but not both,
of those positions.
I.

The Development of Inclusionary Zoning and the Policy
Debate

A.

History of Inclusionary Zoning

Fairfax County, Virginia adopted the first inclusionary zoning ordinance in the country in 1971,40 and it was shortly followed in 1973
by Montgomery County, Maryland. 4 1 The inclusionary zoning technique is now used extensively in California and New Jersey, with scattered use elsewhere, 42 although it is increasingly discussed in other
40.
41.

See Fox & Davis, supra note 24, at 1036-55; Smith et al., supra note 2, at 156.
See Div. OF Hous. & CODE ENFORCEMENT, MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., THE MODER-

ATELY PRICED DWELLING UNIT PROGRAM: MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND'S, INCLUSIONARY

ZONING ORDINANCE, availableat http://hca.emontgomery.org/Housing/MPDU/summary.
htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2002) [hereinafter MONTGOMERY COUNTY].
42. See BOULDER, COLO. REV. CODE, § 9-6.5 (2000); TELLURIDE, COLO., LAND USE CODE
§ 3-710 (2001); and FAIRFAX COUNTY, VA., ZONING ORD. § 2-800 (1998); Roisman, supra
note 6, at 71; Smith et al., supra note 2, at 157-58. Although Roisman also lists Massachusetts, Oregon, and Florida as having effective inclusionary programs, see Roisman, supra
note 6, at 71, the Oregon and Florida programs are statewide growth management programs with inclusionary elements, not comparable to the local zoning ordinances reviewed
here, see Smith et al., supra note 2, at 157-58, while the mandatory element of Massachusetts' program involves state review of local decisions regarding affordable housing
projects. However, in Massachusetts, some communities have adopted mandatory inclusionary ordinances. See Calavita et al., supra note 1, at 111; Herr, supra note 7, at 3-4.
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communities as housing costs rise. 43 Adoption of programs grew rapidly in the 1980s largely in response to double-digit increases in housing prices and to legislative and court-imposed mandates. A severe
housing affordability crisis developed in urban coastal markets in California; by 1992 only twelve percent of families in San Francisco, Los
Angeles, and Orange Counties could afford the average priced
home. 44 While in the 1970s California's housing costs had been close
to the national average, by 1992 the average price of a resale home in
the state was 190 percent of the national average. 45 The steep price
increase was attributed to domestic migration to California in the
1970s and 1980s, the inability of the housing industry to meet demand, increasing use of impact fees by local agencies, and local
growth controls. 46 At the same time, federal subsidies for low-income
housing dropped steeply, making it far more difficult for communities
to create affordable housing by use of subsidies; the Reagan and Bush
administrations cut the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development's funding authority by $21 billion between 1981
and 1992.

47

However, the intervention of the courts in New Jersey and the
passage of state legislation in California were the "central element[s]"
in the two states' widespread use of the program. 48 In New Jersey,
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel49 ("Mt.
Laurel I') mandated that local governments adopt "inclusionary devices such as mandatory set-asides" of some new development for affordable housing to ensure that each community met its fair share of
the regional need for low-income housing. 50 The California legislature required that each municipality adopt a housing element 5' that
calculated each city's share of the regional housing need and required
each city to "make adequate provision" for that need.5

2

One study

43. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
44. SeeJudd & Rosen, supra note 9, at 4.
45. See Calavita et al., supra note 1, at 113.
46. See id.
47. SeeJudd & Rosen, supra note 9, at 4.
48. See Calavita et al., supra note 1, at 135.
49. 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983). In Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel ("Mt. Laurel 1'), 336 A.2d 713 (NJ. 1975), the New Jersey Supreme Court
invalidated Mount Laurel's zoning ordinance as exclusionary and ordered that every developing NewJersey municipality provide its "fair share" of low-income housing. See id. at 734,
724. Mt. Laurel II reviewed the steps taken by Mount Laurel and five other municipalities
to meet their fair share requirements. See Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 410.
50. See 456 A.2d at 448.
51. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65580 (West Supp. 2001).
52. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65583(c) (West Supp. 2001).
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found that a local community's fear of lawsuits based on an inadequate housing element was a significant factor in local jurisdictions'
53
adoption of inclusionary zoning.
Since 1975, over eighty California cities and counties have
adopted such ordinances, resulting in over 25,000 affordable housing
units. 54 Inclusionary ordinances in NewJersey are credited with creat-

ing 15,000 to 20,000 units of low- and moderate-income housing 55 and
a "substantial amount of middle-income housing in suburban areas,
consisting of market-rate units in inclusionary developments." 56 Montgomery County, Maryland, has created some 10,000 "moderately
priced dwelling units" over twenty-five years. 57 Inclusionary zoning, requiring no governmental subsidy, has, in total, provided housing for
over 50,000 families who would not otherwise have been able to
purchase or rent new housing in their communities.
B.

A Primer on Typical Features of Inclusionary Ordinances

The details of inclusionary programs vary widely. How the ordinances are reviewed by the courts may be determined, in part, by how
they are drafted. For instance, an ordinance that establishes set requirements for affordable housing, as opposed to one that reviews
each project on an ad hoc basis, will be treated much more deferentially by the California courts.58 While some inclusionary programs are
voluntary, this Comment is concerned only with ordinances and policies mandating inclusion of low- and moderate-income units in new
housing developments.
Understanding the requirements typically contained in an inclusionary ordinance may help to explain the disagreement over whether
these ordinances should be characterized as exactions or land use regulations. To determine common features, the author reviewed thirty53. See Nico Calavita & Kenneth Grimes, Inclusionay Housing in California: The Experience of Two Decades, 64 APAJ. 150, 165 (1998). In another article, the lead author also notes
the substantial resistance from developers to inclusionary programs, no matter how designed, see Calavita et al., supra note 1, at 120-22, and it can be speculated that this opposition is responsible for the merely sporadic adoption of the program in other states.
54. See Roisman, supra note 6, at 71 n.43 (indicating 22,572 units produced and 2,439
"in the pipeline" as of 1994).
55. SeeJohn M. Payne, Fairly Sharing Affordable Housing Obligations: The Mount Laurel
Matrix, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 365, 368 (2000).
56.
57.
58.

Id.
See Calavita et al., supra note 1, at 111; MONTGOMERY
See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.

COUNTY,

supra note 41, at 7.
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four California inclusionary ordinances and/or policies. 59 This section briefly summarizes the range of key provisions included in these
ordinances, concentrating in particular on the characteristics discussed by the court of appeal in City of Napa.
1. Required Affordable Housing
At the heart of these inclusionary zoning ordinances is a requirement that some portion of newly constructed housing be affordable to
very low- income, low-income, or moderate-income families. 60 Most require that either ten or fifteen percent of the housing be affordable;
six cities, however, require that twenty percent or more of the housing
be affordable, with the most aggressive city requiring thirty-five percent affordability. The ordinances also prescribe the required level of
affordability (whether for very low-, low-, or moderate-income households) and the length of time the units must remain affordable. In
about half the ordinances, rental units are required to be more affordable than for-sale housing. For instance, one city requires ten percent
of ownership housing to be affordable to moderate-income families
(earning up to 120 percent of the median income), while ten percent
of rental housing must be affordable to low-income families (earning
only eighty percent of the median income). Some cities require
greater affordability in larger projects, while others require a higher
percentage of affordable units in more dense projects. The period of
affordability ranges from ten to ninety-nine years to perpetuity; most
typically, the units are required to remain affordable for thirty years.
In almost every case, rents and sale prices are tied to median incomes,
rather than to the developer's construction costs. Typically, monthly
payments are set at thirty percent of income. Two cities do provide,
however, that sale prices may be increased if they do not cover the
developer's financing and construction costs.
2. Alternatives to On-Site Provision of Affordable Units
Almost every ordinance allows a developer to build the affordable
housing on another site if it is infeasible to construct the housing as
part of the project. It remains the developer's responsibility to find
59. See California Agencies with Inclusionary Zoning Ordinances or Policies, in Appendix. This table briefly summarizes key provisions of the ordinances for purposes of
comparison. Note, however, that the ordinances are quite complex, and their actual language must be read to understand fully each city's or county's requirements. The summary
statements included in this section are based on a review of the table.
60. See supra note 1 for definitions of household incomes within these categories.
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the site and negotiate an agreement with its owner. In most cases, the
developer can pay a fee to the local government instead of providing
the affordable housing if the project is small (typically less than ten
units) or if the usual calculation would result in a fractional unit (for
instance, ten percent of thirteen units equals 1.3 units). Somewhat
more than half of the cities also allow a project of any size to pay "inlieu" fees-fees paid in-lieu of actually providing affordable housing
in the project, to be used for creating affordable housing elsewhere.
In a few cases, the in-lieu fees are determined individually on a project-by-project basis. However, in most communities, they are set by
ordinance or resolution.
3.

Incentives

About thirty-five percent of the ordinances provide no incentives
whatsoever to a developer providing inclusionary housing. Others list
a variety of possible incentives to be granted only at the city's discretion or list such low-value incentives as "priorit' processing" or "fast
track review." (When every residential project qualifies for "priority
processing" because all are required to provide inclusionary housing,
priority processing has little value.) Only one city specifically lists financial assistance as an incentive. About half of the cities authorize
their City Council to grant a density bonus, 6 1 often on a one-to-one
basis: for each affordable unit provided, the developer is entitled to
one additional market-rate rate unit. Whether cities actually grant
these bonuses, however, is unknown; 62 in almost all cases, the density
bonuses are discretionary, not mandatory, on the part of the city.

61. A "density bonus" allows the construction of more housing units than would normally be permitted by local zoning ordinances or other land use controls. For instance, if a
developer could normally build 100 homes, a density bonus of 10% would allow him to
build 110 homes. See Smith et al., supra note 2, at 162.
62. Note that California has a Density Bonus law, see CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65915 (West
Supp. 2002), that requires cities to grant density bonuses up to 25% of base density if
developers provide a designated percentage of affordable housing. However, the Density
Bonus law requires that either 20% of the units be affordable to lower income families, or
that 10% be affordable to very low income households, or that 50% be designated for
seniors. Most cities do not require such a large percentage of units to be affordable to families with such low incomes. However, if the developer chooses to provide housing meeting
these standards, then the local agency must grant the density bonus.
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Complete Waivers from the Terms of the Ordinance

Five of the ordinances permit developers to apply for a complete
waiver of the terms of the ordinance. 63 In two cities, the ordinance's
requirements can be waived if the inclusionary units are financially
infeasible; in one city, a waiver can be granted if there are extraordinary site development costs (such as for a toxic cleanup); and in a
fourth, if the developer can show that the ordinance as applied constitutes a taking, he may be granted a waiver. The Napa ordinance permits a complete waiver if the developer can show that there is no
"nexus" between his project and the ordinance. 64
C.

The Policy Debate

1. Support for Inclusionary Zoning
Proponents of inclusionary zoning argue that it is an effective way
to create more affordable housing 65 -more effective than any volun66
tary program.
Developers have no incentive to participate in a voluntary program
unless they are better off as a result of such participation. Even
being equally well off is probably not a sufficient incentive, given
the potential problems in implementation ....
IT] he cost side is
the only place in which an incentive can be created, and the incentive must be sufficiently
large to more than offset lower prices on
67
non-market units.

Even where a "relatively generous" density bonus is given for voluntary
participation, developers often fail to participate because they do not
understand the economics of the program 68 or possibly because of
concern that a density bonus may increase public opposition to a project. Mandatory inclusionary zoning ensures that affordable housing
will be provided.

Inclusionary zoning is also supported as a means of correcting
the detrimental effects of exclusionary zoning. 69 Exclusionary zoning
separates the poor from the non-poor, leading to such problems as
underfunded public institutions, economically depressed communi63. If the terms of an ordinance can be completely waived, it may be more likely to
survive a facial challenge. See discussion infra pp. 30-31.
64. See NAPA, CAL., CODE § 15.94.080 (A) (1999).

65. See Padilla, supra note 2, at 564.
66. See Fox & Davis, supra note 24, at 1067; Herr, supra note 7, at 4; Stonefield, supra
note 24, at 343; Ziegler, supra note 24, at 1-2.
67. Smith et al., supra note 2, at 164.
68. See Fox & Davis, supra note 24, at 1067.
69. See Calavita & Grimes, supra note 53, at 152; Padilla, supra note 2, at 569.
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ties, and increased racial segregation. 70 Inclusionary zoning, by contrast, promotes socioeconomic integration. Positive benefits include
providing the poor with higher quality educational opportunities and
the ability to live in a middle-class community with lower crime rates.
As low-skill jobs migrate to the suburbs, inclusionary units provide better access to those jobs and may substantially decrease commute
times. 7 1 Inclusionary zoning can also be considered a means to recapture land prices that have been artificially inflated by communities'
exclusionary policies.
Finally, from a local agency standpoint, inclusionary zoning provides affordable housing at no public cost. Incentives such as density
bonuses, expedited processing, and reduced parking requirements
can all be provided without public funding.
2.

Critiques of Inclusionary Zoning

Detractors argue that the program unfairly requires landowners,
developers, and middle-income homebuyers to subsidize affordable
housing. More importantly, they argue that the program will not
achieve its goal of creating more affordable housing and may, in fact,
have directly opposite effects. These policy arguments have been far
more influential in limiting the use of inclusionary zoning than legal
attacks, which have been few. 72 In addition, these policy critiques

often inform the legal challenges.
a. Unfair Burdens on Landowners, Developers, and Other
Homebuyers
The cost of the inclusionary units must be borne by someone,
whether landowners, developers, or market-rate buyers in a project.
The usual argument made in opposition to inclusionary ordinances is
that the developer will raise the price of the remaining homes by the
difference between the inclusionary price and the market price. In the
case of Suburbia, for example, the developer would raise the cost of
70. See Mallakh, supra note 31, at 1853-54.
71. For a lengthy discussion of policy reasons to support inclusionary zoning, see Padilla, supra note 2, at 564-70.
72. See Calavita et al., supra note 1, at 120-22. Opposition to inclusionary programs
remains strong. See, e.g., Hollister, supra note 13 ("opponents of the plan have called it
social engineering at its worst"); Lori Weisberg, City leaders return to a simmering issueaffordable housing, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Apr. 15, 2002, at BI ("10 years [ago] a
similar program went down to defeat in the wake of strong builder opposition"); Housing
Shortage, supra note 21 (opposing inclusionary zoning as requiring a subsidy from builders
to make up for cities' exclusionary zoning).
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the ninety market-priced single-family homes by $21,333 each
($1,920,000 divided by ninety market-priced homes) to compensate
for the reduced prices of the ten inclusionary units. Using an identical
analysis, the Northern California Homebuilders Association charged
that a fifteen percent inclusionary requirement proposed in Union
City, California, would raise the price of each market-rate unit by
nearly $31,000 to make up for the reduced prices of the inclusionary
units.73 However, this assertion is too simplistic. It assumes that developers can raise their prices without constraint; or, viewed another way,
that developers would charge less than the market can bear if they did
74
not have to provide inclusionary housing.
In a more sophisticated and very influential 1981 article, 75 Robert
Ellickson 7 6 concluded that the costs might be borne by other
homebuyers or renters, the developer, or the landowner. 77 Theoretically, programs could be designed that would create no additional
costs for anyone; communities could provide density bonuses large
enough to cover the entire cost of the inclusionary units. In practice,
however, they rarely did so. 78 Who bore the costs in the long run

would depend on the desirability of the community and its place in
the regional housing market. If the community were highly desirable,
the developer would be able to raise his prices to cover at least part of
the reduced price for the inclusionary units, and at least part of the
cost would be borne by the buyers or renters of the market-rate
units. 79 However, if the city were not particularly sought-after, and the
developer could not raise his prices to compensate for the decreased
profits, the developer would bear the entire cost initially. Once the
ordinances were in effect, owners of residential land would bear at
least part of the cost. Developers would bid less for residential land
73. See Phil Serna, Impacts of inclusionarypolicies make housing less affordable, HBA NEWS
(July/Aug. 2001), available at http://www.hbanc.org/news2000/JulAug2001/JulAug01
feat2.html (last visited June 25, 2002).
74. See Smith et al., supra note 2, at 164 (" [P] rice increases for market-rate units are
presumably attainable without participation" in inclusionary programs.).
75. See generally Ellickson, supra note 19. See also Dietderich, supra note 20, at 26-27
("[R]esistance [to inclusionary zoning] is based almost entirely on Robert Ellickson's article ....
Citations to Ellickson for the proposition that inclusionary zoning rules hurt the
poor are legion."). Dietderich lists eleven law review articles and two books that cite Ellickson for this proposition. See id. at 27 n.7.
76. Ellickson is a property rights advocate, now the Walter E. Meyer Professor of Property and Urban Law at Yale Law School, formerly at the University of Southern California
Law School from 1970-81. See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1167.
77. See id. at 1190.
78. See id. at 1181; Berger, supra note 19, at 205.
79. See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1190-91.
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because of the inclusionary requirements. 80 In other words, builders
would pay less for land because the inclusionary zoning would lower
their profits. In a city that was not sought-after, "in the long run, the
owners of underdeveloped land bear all of the burden." 8 1 Where the
city was unique, landowners would bear only "partof the burden," 82 in
which case part of the cost would be passed on to buyers.8 3 Ellickson
concluded that most cities imposing these requirements were highly
desirable; hence the programs increased84 costs to market-rate
homebuyers and renters in almost all cases.
b.

Reductions in Housing Affordability

Ellickson's most devastating charge was that inclusionary zoning
actually decreased the supply of affordable housing. He concluded
that most inclusionary units were bestowed on families in the middle
third of the income distribution, 5 but that only a "tiny fraction" of
even those families benefited. 8 6 At the same time, the costs of the inclusionary housing acted as a tax on housing and reduced its profitability to developers, lowering the overall housing supply by
discouraging housing development.8 7 The reduced supply resulted in
less housing "filtering down" to lower-income families, and overall
housing prices became much higher.8 8 The result? Higher housing
prices for the majority of middle-income families that did not benefit
from the program.89 Thus, the irony of so-called "inclusionary"
programs.
3.

Responses and Conclusion

a.

Who Pays for Inclusionary Housing?

The assertion that other homeowners will pay for inclusionary
housing is a particularly potent political argument, because it seems
inherently unfair that new homebuyers should be forced to subsidize
80. See id. at 1190.
81. Id. at 1191.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 1190-91.
84. See id. at 1192.
85. See. id. at 1215-16.
86. Id. at 1184.
87. See generally Serna, supra note 73.
88. See id.; Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1203-04. The concept of "filtering down" assumes that as new market-priced housing is built, existing owners will "move up" to better
housing, and eventually the least expensive existing housing will "filter down" to lower
income families. See Dietderich, supra note 20, at 43.
89. See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1215-16.
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others. The argument continues to be used by opponents of inclusionary ordinances.9 0
Cities and others that have conducted economic analyses have
found results that are similar to-but not identical with-those of Ellickson. They have usually concluded that, in the long run, regardless
of the desirability of the community, most of the costs are borne by
landowners. 9 ' Initially, before land prices have had time to adjust, either the market-rate buyers or the developer pays, depending on
whether the market allows the developer to increase his prices.9 2 If the
developer cannot raise the price for the market-rate units or lower his
total costs, or some combination, his profits will decline. 93 However,
90.

See, e.g., Michael Neal, Inclusionary strategies only add to housing costs, SAN DIEGO

UNION-TRIBUNE, Apr. 17, 2002, at B7.

[T]he city of San Diego wants to levy a special tax on the already burdened
homebuyer. The tax would pay for inclusionary housing and it would add $10,000
to $20,000 to the cost of every new home. Many people wrongly believe that the
building would carry the brunt of the costs and home prices will not increase as a
result of inclusionary housing. This is a myth. Homebuilders/developers do not
pay this cost, the buyers do. Inclusionary housing as currently proposed by the
city is delivering low-income housing on the backs of new homeowners.
Id. Neal is president of the Building Industry Association of San Diego County. See id.
91. See Smith et al., supra note 2, at 162 ("In the long run ... the price effects of
inclusionary zoning may be borne by landowners who sell land to builders. Builders would
incorporate the cost into a lower bid price for land."); KEYSER MARSTON ASSOCIATES, INC.,
IMPACT EVALUATION: BMR AND NEXUS FEE PROPOSAL, PREPARED FOR CITY OF SAN MATEO,
CAL. (May 2001), 5 (on file at the University of San Francisco Law Review office) (concluding that land prices would be reduced forty percent if an existing inclusionary requirement
were increased from ten to twenty percent with greater affordability) [hereinafter IMPACT
EVALUATION]; MUNDIE & ASSOCIATES, ANALYSIS OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING REQUIREMENTS INCORPORATED IN THE HOUSING ELEMENT OF THE GENERAL PLAN, CITY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO,

CAL. (1997 Update), 1-2, 24 (July 1997) (on file at the University of San Francisco Law
Review office) (showing reduction in land value of 7 to 65 percent and increase in market
price of 1 to 17 percent depending on inclusionary program selected) [hereinafter
MUNDIE & ASSOCIATES]; e-mail from Diana Elrod, Solutions for Affordable Housing, to Barbara Kautz (May 28, 2002, 02:47 PM PDT) (citing CITY OF MOUNTAIN VIEW, CAL., HOUSING

(on file at the University of San Francisco Law Review office) ("[A]ccording
to . . .the consensus of a focus group of local developers, the cost of the [inclusionary
housing] program is generally passed on to the property owner selling his land for housing-rather than to the price or rental of the housing units."); e-mail from Darin Smith,
Economic & Planning Systems, Inc., to Barbara Kautz (May 29, 2002, 04:22 PM PDT) (on
file at the University of San Francisco Law Review office) ("[T]he short answer is that,
while the costs may be shared among developers and landowners, the landowners likely
suffer the most loss. Prospective homeowners are least likely to be affected, as their willingness to pay is what sets the market price, not the costs incurred by the developer."). Note
that, by providing adequate density bonuses, cities may design their programs so that there
are no costs to anyone.
92. See Smith et al., supra note 2, at 158-61.
93. See id. at 159.
ELEMENT)
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"[i] n the long run .. .the price effects ...[are] borne by landowners
94
who sell land to builders."
The real disagreement is over whether this is unfair. Proponents
argue that many zoning controls affect land values. More broadly, because land values are primarily a reflection of the community's economic activity and the government's investment in infrastructure,
rather than a result of the landowner's efforts, proponents argue that
it is not unfair for the landowner to bear the costs. 95 There is also a
substantial body of literature concluding that high housing prices are
the result of local zoning policies that create artificial shortages of developable land for housing. 96 The shortages have inflated land costs,
and landowners have gained windfall profits due solely to cities' zoning policies. In this scenario, inclusionary zoning can be viewed as a
way for the public to share in the windfall profits it created. 97 Exclusionary zoning is converted, in effect, into subsidies for inclusionary
housing.

98

Nonetheless, landowners and developers believe strongly that
they are paying for a public good whose cost should be borne by the
community at large. In the end, this perceived unfairness may have
brought about the City of Napa litigation: "Instead of everybody sharing the cost [of building affordable housing], we target a few individuals because they happen to own some land."99
94. Id. at 162. Unusual economic conditions, however-either an expansive market
accompanied by rapidly rising housing costs, when costs are likely largely absorbed by market-rate buyers, or a plummeting market, when costs are likely absorbed by developers
holding overpriced land-can alter this conclusion. See Calavita et al., supra note 1, at 121,
132. Note that it could be argued that the conclusions reflect the parties' desired political
ends. If new homebuyers will shoulder the costs, that will be less politically acceptable and
will tend to defeat a proposed ordinance, whereas communities are typically less protective
of developers' land values.
95. See Calavita & Grimes, supra note 53, at 152; Dwight Merriam, Panel Comments, in
INCLUSIONARY ZONING Movs DowNyrOwN 95-96 (Dwight Merriam et al. eds., 1985).
96. See, e.g., EDWARD L. GLAESER &JOSEPH GYOURKO, THE IMPACT OF ZONING ON HousING AFFORDABILITY, Working Paper 8835, National Bureau of Economic Research (2002);
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8835 (last visited June 25, 2002).
97. See Merriam, supra note 95, at 95.
98. See Dietderich, supra note 20, at 103.
99. Bob Egelko, Court Backs Low-Income Housing Units; Developers' Challenge to Napa Law
Rejected, S.F. CHRON., June 8, 2001, at A4 (quoting Harold Johnson, Pacific Legal Foundation attorney). See also James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, A Limitation on Development
Impact Exactions to Limit Social Policy-Making: Interpretingthe Takings Clause to Limit Land Use
Policy-Makingfor Social Welfare Goals of Urban Communities, 9 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1,
17-18 (2000) (stating that takings claims often arise when developers believe local ordinances impose "unreasonable economic burdens that obligate them to pay for public benefits enjoyed by the community").
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Does Inclusionary Zoning Increase Housing Costs?

An extensive review of Ellickson's article criticized his economic
assumptions regarding filtering mechanisms, the operation of the
housing market, and the design of inclusionary programs. It concluded that not only will inclusionary ordinances create more affordable housing than would be built without them, but also that, with
density bonuses, inclusionary ordinances will expand the aggregate
supply of all housing. 10 0 Even Ellickson conceded that an adequate
density bonus could reduce, or even eliminate, the "tax" an inclusionary program places on a developer 0 1 and thus its impact on the housing supply.
Nonetheless, concerns remain that inclusionary ordinances, if unaccompanied by density bonuses, may reduce housing production or
increase housing costs. For instance, landowners faced with declining
land costs will most likely wait to sell until market inflation is great
enough to cover the costs of the inclusionary units. Until the market
catches up, there will be fewer land sales and less housing development. 10 2 The need to absorb more costs into a project may force a
developer to build more luxurious, higher priced market-rate units.
Finally, if the inclusionary requirements are excessive and undercut
profits too much, they may reduce housing production to a level
where the program does indeed have an exclusionary effect.1 03
Because of the number of variables, the available evidence does
not demonstrate conclusively that inclusionary zoning either lowers
overall housing production or increases it, nor whether it raises the
market price of housing or reduces land costs.' 0

4

Given the current

prevalence of restrictive suburban land use controls, inclusionary zoning appears a rational way to produce affordable housing, reduce income segregation, and recapture some of the windfall increases in
land costs created by restrictive zoning ordinances. However, inclusionary requirements should be accompanied by real compensatory measures-in particular, substantial density bonuses-to minimize any
effects on the overall housing supply.
100. See Dietderich, supra note 20, at 28.
101. See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1180.
102. See e-mail from Kate Funk, Keyser-Marston Associates, to Barbara Kautz (May 31,
2002, 11:48 PDT) (on file at the University of San Francisco Law Review office).
103. See Thomas Kleven, Inclusionary Ordinances and the Nexus Issue, in INCLUSIONARY
ZONING MovEs DowNTowN 109, 124 (Dwight Merriam et al. eds., 1985).
104. See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1180. See also e-mail from Nico Calavita to Barbara
Kautz (June 4, 2002, 04:42 PDT) (on file at the University of San Francisco Law Review
office) ("There are no empirical studies.").
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Inclusionary Ordinances: Land Use Regulations or
Exactions?

In its brief in opposition to a grant of certiorari, the City of Napa
stated bluntly that its ordinance "does not require either a dedication
or an exaction. Rather, it is a land use regulation."1 0 5 The Home
Builders Association responded, "[c] learly, the requirement here is an
exaction. Landowners must dedicate a portion of their development
efforts and property to a low-income housing subsidy, or pay cash and
substitute one form of exaction for another."10 6 The judicial scrutiny
applied to inclusionary ordinances-and hence their ability to survive
a legal challenge-depends significantly on how they are characterized. While the courts have applied a deferential standard to requirements that can be characterized as generally applicable land use
regulations, exactions may be subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny developed by the United States Supreme Court, or to various
levels of scrutiny developed by state courts. However, there is no settled jurisprudence regarding precisely which regulations are subject
to intermediate scrutiny. In City of Napa, the HBA attempted to subject
inclusionary zoning-and by implication a wider range of regulations-to intermediate scrutiny. 10 7 This section describes the background to the legal issues raised in City of Napa.
A.

The Agins Standard for Takings

Prior to the takings cases of the past twenty years, courts had long
applied a deferential standard of review to local land use ordinances.
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.' 0 8 established that the legal basis for zoning
is the "police power" of a city to protect the "health, safety, morals,
and general welfare" of its residents. 0 9 In Euclid, the United States
Supreme Court applied substantive due process review to local zoning
ordinances and upheld them so long as they were not "arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relationship" to the police
power." 0 The Court agreed that if it was fairly debatable that an ordi105. Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 1, Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 122
S. Ct. 1356 (2002) (No. 01-893).
106. Petitioner's Reply to the Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Home
Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 122 S. Ct. 1356 (2002) (No. 01-893).
107. See Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 65 (Ct. App. 2001).
108. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
109. Id. at 395.
110. Id. (citing Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U. S.526, 529, 530 (1917) andJacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30-31 (1905)).
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nance was reasonably related to the general welfare, it would be
upheld. 1 '
However, in Agins v. City of Tiburon,1 12 the Supreme Court reviewed a local zoning ordinance under the Takings Clause of the Constitution, 113 rather than under the Due Process Clause. The Agins
brought suit after the City of Tiburon, California, zoned their five-acre
property for one to five houses. The Agins never applied for permission to develop but rather claimed that the zoning on its face constituted a "taking" of their property. 1 4 The Court held that a "general
zoning law" would not, on its face, effect a taking if it "substantially
advance[d] legitimate state interests," and did not deny an owner all
"economically viable use of his land." 115 In relation to the Agins' property, the Court found that the ordinance substantially advanced legitimate government goals of limiting urbanization and protecting open
space and on its face permitted the economically viable use of singlefamily homes. 16

Although the Agins "substantially advance" standard sounds similar to, and appears to have been derived from, Euclid's substantive due
process "rational basis" test,' 17 it is in actuality somewhat less deferential; the state interest must be legitimate and the regulation must "substantially advance" the state interest, requiring a greater
correspondence between means and ends. 118 In Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission,' "9 Justice Scalia emphasized that it is a more rigorous test. 120 Nonetheless, as most courts have interpreted the "substantially advance" test, it continues to leave great room for governmental
discretion in developing land use regulations. The burden rests on
the applicant to demonstrate that a regulation represents an "arbitrary" deprivation of property rights by not advancing legitimate state
111.

See id. at 387. From 1928 to 1962, the Supreme Court reviewed no zoning cases. See

STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 26, § 9.11 at 579.

112. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
113. See U.S. CoNST. amend.V (prohibiting the taking of private property for "public
use, without just compensation."). See generally Agins, 447 U.S. 255.
114. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 257.
115. Id. at 260.
116. See id. at 261-62.
117. See Ronald H. Rosenberg & Nancy Stroud, When Lochner Met Dolan: The Attempted
Transformation of American Land-Use Law by ConstitutionalInterpretation, 33 URB. LAw. 663,
670 (2001); Edward H. Ziegler, Development Exactions and Permit Decisions: The Supreme
Court's Nollan, Dolan, and Del Monte Dunes Decisions, 34 URB. LAw. 155, 157-58 (2002).
118. See Rosenberg & Stroud, supra note 117, at 674-77; Ziegler, supra note 117, at
157-59.
119. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
120. See id. at 834 n.3.
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12 1
interests or by denying all economically viable use of the property.
Local regulations have not often been overturned based on the Agins
122
standard alone.

B.

The Standard for Review of Exactions

1. Intermediate Scrutiny: The Nollan/Dolan Standard

23

Between 1987 and 1994, the United States Supreme Court elaborated the "substantially advance" prong of Agins and developed an intermediate level of scrutiny-often called "heightened scrutiny" or the
Nollan/Dolantest-to examine certain conditions applied to development projects. Heightened scrutiny requires cities to "provide greater
124
policy justifications to landowners and developers."
Both Nollan and Dolan involved property owners who were required to dedicate property to a public agency as a condition of development approval. In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission
demanded a public access easement across the beach at the front of
Nollan's lot to mitigate the view blockage from Highway 1 caused by
his new house.1 25 The Supreme Court found no nexus between the
project's impact (blocking views from Highway 1) and a pedestrian
access across the front of the property that provided no views from the
highway. 126 Because a portion of Nollan's property was clearly being
taken for public use (for a public easement), the Supreme Court required that there be an "essential nexus" between the condition of
approval and the impacts of the Nollans' project to meet Agins' re121. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 n.8 (1994). Note that the Associated
Home Builders in City of Napa challenged Napa's inclusionary ordinance under only the
"substantially advance" prong of Agins, never alleging that the ordinance deprived builders
of all economically viable use of their property or that the ordinance constituted an economic taking under the test established in Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See Petitioner's Reply to the Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7 n.6, Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 122 S. Ct. 1356 (2002) (No. 01-893)
("Because the Takings Clause claim is based on allegations that the Ordinance fails to
substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest .... Petitioner is not alleging a
denial of economically viable use .. ") (internal citations omitted).
122. See Holloway & Guy, supra note 99, at 18. But see Rosenberg & Stroud, supra note
117, at 677 (stating that some courts will use the "substantially advance" test as a vehicle for
"highly intrusive review"); Ziegler, supra note 117, at 158 n.23 (listing regulations overturned on the basis of "substantially advance" analysis).
123. See Nollan, 483 U.S. 825; Dolan, 512 U.S. 374.
124. Holloway & Guy, supra note 98, at 8-9.
125. See 483 U.S. 828-29.
126. See id. at 836-37.
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quirement that a governmental action "substantially advance" a legiti127
mate state interest.
In Dolan, the City of Tigard, Oregon, required that the Dolans, in
exchange for permission to expand their store, dedicate land to the
city for a storm drainage system and for a pedestrian and bicycle
path. 28 The Court agreed that there was an "essential nexus" between
the conditions and the impacts of the project. The project would in
fact generate additional runoff which could be mitigated by a storm
drainage system and would create additional traffic which could be
reduced by creating routes for pedestrians and bicyclists.' 29 However,
the Court held that the city had not shown that the required dedications were proportional to the impact of the Dolans' project. The
Court held that there must be "rough proportionality" between the
impact of the project and the conditions imposed. To establish rough
proportionality, it required the city to make some sort of "individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development."' 130 The
Court specifically placed the burden of proof on the city to demonstrate that its conditions were closely related to the specific impact of
the project 13 1-as opposed to the Agins "substantially advance" stan13 2
dard, where the burden of proof is on the applicant.
The Nollan/Dolan standard is greatly preferred by the development community because it places an increased burden on local agencies to justify the constitutionality of their policies. In relation to an
inclusionary zoning ordinance, the Agins standard would require only
that a city demonstrate that the ordinance "substantially advances" the
legitimate governmental purpose of providing affordable housing and
that it not deny developers all economically viable use of their property. Requiring a project to include affordable housing is clearly related to a city's legitimate interest in providing affordable housing.
The case would be particularly strong where, as in California and New
Jersey, a state has placed an affirmative obligation on cities to provide
affordable housing.1 33 Similarly, requiring a small percentage of affordable housing would be unlikely to deprive an owner of all economically viable use. Evidence that others had complied with the
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See id. at 837.
See 512 U.S. at 394-96.
See id. at 387-88.
Id. at 391.
See id.
See id. at 391 n.8.
See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
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standards, economic studies, and incentives such as density bonuses
could all be used to support the economic viability of the ordinance.
Under the Nollan/Dolanstandard, however, the burden of proof
would be on the city. Showing an "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" between a project's impact and the inclusionary requirement would be far more difficult. The city would first need to show
that construction of market-rate housing created a need for affordable
housing and then would need to make specific findings to demonstrate the "rough proportionality" between the project's specific impact on the need for affordable housing and the inclusionary
requirements imposed-clearly a more daunting prospect. Even supporters of inclusionary zoning have noted that such ordinances could
be attacked on the basis that there is no nexus between the development of market-rate housing and the creation of a need for more af1

fordable housing.

34

The issue, then, is whether the Nollan/Dolan test applies outside
the particular facts of Nollan and Dolan, where public agencies required dedications135 of property during the individualized review of ap-

plications to develop property. Not surprisingly, the property rights
movement has sought to expand the applicability of the test, even to
the extent of its being applicable to any zoning requirement. 136 However, in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 137 in a conclusion

concurred with by all ninejustices, the Court in dicta appeared to expressly limit heightened scrutiny to exactions.
[W] e have not extended the rough-proportionality test of Dolanbeyond the special context of exactions-land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedicationof property to public

use. The rule applied in Dolan considers whether dedications demanded as conditions of development
are proportional to the de38

velopment's anticipated impacts.'

134. SeeJudd & Rosen, supra note 9, at 5 (The "legal arguments for such a challenge
have existed for a number of years.").
135. "The donation of land or creation of an easement for public use." BLAcK's LAW
DICTIONARY, 7th ed. (2000).
136. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, HardBargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IowA L. REv. 1, 4, 13 (2000) (noting that the varying standards create a "logical
anomaly. Land use bargains [between individual developers and municipalities] are constrained by proportionality requirements, while land use decisions... are not." "Nexus and
proportionality standards might be logically applied to land use regulation generally.").
137. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
138. Id. at 702-03 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). The majority opinion
was signed by five justices. In a partial concurrence, Justice Souter,joined by the remaining
justices, stated, "I agree in rejecting extension of 'rough proportionality' as a standard for
reviewing land-use regulations .. " Id. at 733 (Souter, J., concurring and dissenting).
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What has not been defined by the Court is an "exaction;" and
whether the Nollan/Dolan test applies to all exactions. 139 To date,
there is not a "consistent jurisprudence" for applying the test.1 40 Even
where a requirement is clearly an exaction-such as the payment of
fees and construction of public improvements-the Nollan/Dolantest
is not always applied. Some courts, in fact, have limited the test to the
dedication of land.1 4' A further issue is whether the test applies to
exactions imposed pursuant to generally applicable legislative acts as
well as to conditions applied during the review of individual development applications.' 42 There is a "recently emerging body of case law"
holding that generally applicable fees applied on a uniform basis to
development projects are not subject to Nollan/Dolan.143 Since Del
Monte Dunes, the lower courts have tended to further restrict the appli14 4
cability of Nollan/Dolan to individualized exactions.
In California, the Supreme Court has specifically limited Nollan/
Dolan to fees and dedication of property required on an "individualized

139. Virtually all of the cases and articles reviewed by the author for this Comment
define "exactions" only by reference to specific activities-dedication of land, payment of
fees, construction of public improvements-rather than in a generic sense that permits
applicability beyond these specific examples. Two exceptions are a Washington appellate
court decision, Benchmark Land. Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 14 P.3d 172, 175 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2000) (applying Nollan/Dolanbecause a mandatory street improvement "required the
developer to address a problem that existed outside the development property .... [a]nd
the development did not cause this problem"); and STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 26,
§ 9.33 at 688 (distinguishing an exaction from a regulation as a requirement for the actual
transfer of land or a fee from the developer to the government). In their petition for writ
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the HBA implicitly defined an exaction
as "the forced payment of land, money, or labor." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10,
Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 122 S. Ct. 1356 (2002) (No. 01-893).
140. Rosenberg & Stroud, supranote 117, at 678. See generally Ziegler, supra note 117, at
161-65 (discussing issues regarding application of the Nollan/Dolan test).
141. See Nancy E. Stroud, A Review of Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey and Its
Implications, 15J. LAND USE & Er, vrL. L 195, 203-04(1999); Ziegler, supra note 117, at 162
n.39-40.
142. See Ziegler, supra note 117, at 163-64.
143. Id. at 1.64-65 n.51.
144. See Stroud, supra note 139, at 205-06 (discussing decisions following Del Monte
Dunes). Relying on Del Monte Dunes, the New York Court of Appeals and the Colorado
Supreme Court have limited the use of the Dolan "rough proportionality" test. See Krupp v.
Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 697 (Colo. 2001) (upholding generally applicable sewer fees and holding that Nollan/Dolan apply "only where the government demand[s] real property as a condition of development"); Bonnie Briar Syndicate, Inc. v.
Town of Mamaroneck, 721 N.E.2d 971, 975-76 (N.Y. 1999) (holding that, pursuant to Del
Monte Dunes, Nollan/Dolan is applicable only to exactions and upholding rezoning of a golf
course from residential to recreation).
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basis as a condition for development," 145 because under those circumstances there is a heightened risk that local governments could use
the police power to exact unconstitutional conditions. However, "generally applicable legislation is subject to the ordinary restraints of the
democratic political process" 146 and, thus, warrants a more deferential
standard of review. The most deferential standard of review is reserved
for "essentially legislative determinations that do not require any physical conveyance of property." 147 In California, then, an inclusionary
ordinance, which is a legislative determination not requiring any physical conveyance of property, would be entitled to the most deferential
standard of review, even if the inclusionary requirements can be characterized as exactions.
2.

State Law Standards for Exactions

Regardless of the United States Supreme Court's standards for
review, most states review exactions under rules more rigorous than
Agins' "substantially advance" standard but less demanding than the
Nollan/Dolan"rough proportionality" test. The strictest standard is applied in Illinois and Rhode Island, which permit dedications and fees
only to mitigate impacts that are "specifically and uniquely attributable" to a development.1 48 Most states, including California, 4 9 apply a
"rational nexus" or "reasonable relationship" test, limiting fees and
exactions to "needs created by, and benefits conferred upon" a
project.

150

This "reasonable relationship" test was recently elaborated by the
California Supreme Court in San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San
Francisco.t 5 1 The court considered a takings challenge to a San Francisco ordinance having some similarity to an inclusionary ordinance.
It required that any hotel converting a residential hotel room1

52

to

145. San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 103 (Cal. 2002)
(quoting Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d 993, 1001 (Cal. 1999))
(emphasis added).
146. San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 105.
147. Id. at 103 (quoting Santa Monica Beach, 968 P.2d at 1001).
148. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supranote 26, § 9.32 at 680 (citing Pioneer Trust & Savings
Bank v. Village of Mt. Prospect, 176 N.E. 2d 799, 802 (1961)).
149. See DANIELJ. CURTIN, JR. & CECILY T. TALBERT, CURTIN's CALIFORNIA LAND USE AND
PLANNING LAw, at 269 (22nd ed. 2002).
150. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 26, § 9.32 at 680 (citing Longridge Builders,
Inc., v. Planning Board, 245 A.2d 336, 337 (N.J. 1968)).
151. 41 P.3d 87 (Cal. 2002).
152. A residential hotel room is a room occupied by one person for at least thirty-two
consecutive days. See id. at 92.
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another use either replace each room lost on a one-for-one basis, or
pay a fee equal to the cost of a replacement site plus a portion of the
new construction costs. 153 After being assessed a fee of $567,000 to

convert its sixty-two room hotel to tourist use, 154 the San Remo Hotel
alleged (among other claims) that the ordinance did not "substantially advance a legitimate government interest" because the fee was
not "roughly proportional" to the impact of the project (the Nollan/
Dolan test) .155 While rejecting the application of Nollan/Dolan to a
generally applicable fee and upholding the city's ordinance (both
facially and as-applied) ,156 the court stated:
As a matter of both statutory and constitutional law, [development
mitigation] fees must bear a reasonable relationship,in both intended
use and amount, to the deleterious public impact of the development ....While the relationship between means and ends need

not be so close or so thoroughly established for legislatively imposed fees as for ad hoc fees ... the arbitrary and extortionate use
of purported
mitigation fees . . . will not pass constitutional
1 57
muster.

If, then, an inclusionary ordinance is examined as a generally applicable mitigation fee, rather than as a land use regulation, it will
need to have an adequate factual basis to demonstrate a "reasonable
relationship" between the ordinance's requirements and the impact
of the development. As opposed to the Nollan/Dolan "rough proportionality" test, this test places the burden of proof on the plaintiff,
gives more deference to the legislative judgment, and does not require quite as close a fit between means and ends.1 58 However, under
this test a city would still need to show that the inclusionary requirements were reasonably related to the impacts of residential development on the need for affordable housing, rather than to the
government's legitimate interest in providing affordable housing.

153. See id.
154. See id. at 95.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 111.
157. Id. at 105-06. Note that Justice Scalia equated the "reasonable relationship" test to
the "rough proportionality" test that the Court formulated in Dolan. See Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1994). However, commentators often consider the "reasonable relationship" test to be a more deferential standard. See, e.g., Ziegler, supra note 117, at
164-65.
158. See San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 106; Ziegler, supra note 117, at 164-65.
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Other Courts' Review of Inclusionary Ordinances

Prior to City of Napa, the constitutionality of inclusionary ordinances had been reviewed in only three cases. Two of the three cases
were decided prior to Nollan, and all three prior to Dolan.
1.

An Early Loss: Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. DeGroff
Enterprises59

The first inclusionary ordinance in the country was adopted on
September 1, 1971 by the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors. It required any developer of fifty or more housing units to make at least
fifteen percent of the units affordable to low- and moderate-income
families.1 60 The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed that the provision
of affordable housing served a legitimate state interest. 16 1 However, it
concluded that the state's zoning enabling act permitted localities to
enact only zoning ordinances that were directed at traditional physical
characteristics of developments and not ordinances directed at including or excluding "any particular socio-economic group." 162 Further,
the ordinance's attempt to "control compensation" for property not
only exceeded the authority granted by the zoning enabling act but
also constituted a taking of property under the Virginia constitu1 64
tion. 163 The ordinance was consequently invalidated.
The Virginia court's lead was not followed elsewhere in the country. In fact, one treatise states flatly, "[t] his case was wrongly decided.
The loss that a mandatory lower-income housing requirement is likely
1 65
to impose on a developer is not substantial enough for a taking."
Even the Virginia courts seem to have come to this conclusion; in
1989, the Virginia legislature adopted legislation permitting Fairfax
County to adopt an inclusionary zoning ordinance,1 66 and the County
67
is currently implementing its inclusionary program.
159.

198 S.E.2d 600 (Va. 1973).

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See id.
See id. at 601.
Id. at 602.
See id.
See id.
MANDELKER, supra note 2, § 7.26 at 325.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2304 (Michie Supp. 2001).

165.
166.

167. See

FAIRMAX COUNTY, VA., ZONING ORD.

§ 2-800 (1998), available at http://www.

fairfaxcounty.gov/dpz/PDFjfiles/Ordinance/art02.pdf; FAIRFAX COUNTY, VA., KEY PROVISIONS OF THE FAIRFAX COUNTY AFFORDABLE DWELLING UNIT (ADU) ORDINANCE (Mar. 31,
1998), availableat http://www.co.fairfax.va.us/gov/rha/adu/Keyprovisions.pdf (last visited

June 26, 2002).
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New Jersey's Mt. Laurel II and Holmdel Decisions

The last major case regarding inclusionary zoning was decided in
1983 by the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel.168 In considering remedies for the
exclusionary zoning practices of several New Jersey cities, the New
Jersey court rejected the Virginia court's distinction between socioeconomic and other zoning. The court noted that all zoning, such as that
for "[d] etached single family residential zones, high-rise multi-family
zones of any kind .... indeed[,] practically any significant kind of
zoning" had inherent socioeconomic characteristics. 169 The court
held that, where a community's obligation to provide housing for all
income groups could not be met by the removal of zoning restrictions, "inclusionary devices such as .. .mandatory set-asides keyed to
the construction of lower income housing, are constitutional and
70
within the zoning power of a municipality."'
The court found that it was essential for communities in New
Jersey to provide realistic opportunities to construct lower income
housing 7 l and that inclusionary zoning-even though it involved
control of resale prices and rents to create affordability for a particular income group-was an appropriate way to accomplish that. 17 2 "We
know of no governmental purpose . . . that is served by requiring a
municipality to ingeniously design detailed land use regulations ...
actually aimed at accommodating lower income families, while not allowing it directly to require developers to construct lower income
units." 173 The court analogized inclusionary requirements to requirements for single-family homes on large lots, a form of zoning intended
to create housing for high-income groups. 74 By holding that there is
no real difference between physical zoning requirements used to create high-income housing and price controls used to create lower income housing, the case provides a strong argument for viewing
inclusionary requirements as land use ordinances.
In 1990, in Holmdel Builders Ass'n v.Township of Holmdel,175 the
NewJersey Supreme Court revisited the issue while reviewing the constitutionality of affordable housing fees required by several New Jersey
168.
169.
170.
172.

456 A.2d 390 (NJ. 1983).
Id. at 449.
Id. at 448.
See id. at 449.
See id. at 448.

173.

Id. at 449-50.

174.

Id. at 449.

175.

583 A.2d 277 (N.J. 1990).

171.
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cities. The court continued to view inclusionary devices as zoning ordinances rather than as exactions similar to "off-site infrastructure im176
provements occasioned by a particular development."
Consequently, the court refused to apply the Nollan "essential nexus"
test, concluding that "the rational-nexus test is not apposite in deter177
mining the validity of inclusionary zoning devices generally."'
Rather than basing affordable housing requirements on the impact of
a project, "the relationship is to be founded on the relationship that
...development has on both the need for lower-income residential
development and on the opportunity and capacity of municipalities to
178
...
meet that need.
Mt. Laurel II and Holmdel Builders Ass'n provide the strongest published justification to date for viewing inclusionary ordinances as land
use regulations-not exactionsI 79-designed to carry out the state's
strong interest in providing housing for all income groups. 80° In this
the New Jersey courts went further than the City of Napa court, which
did not need to consider whether the ordinance was an exaction to
81
reach its decision.
HI.

Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa'82 and Future Takings
Challenges to Inclusionary Ordinances

City of Napa is the first appellate court decision to review the constitutionality of inclusionary zoning since the United States Supreme
Court's decisions in both Nollan and Dolan. The latter two cases have
created the "specter of a possible constitutional challenge" 8 3 to inclusionary zoning despite the technique's success in creating affordable
housing. Had the HBA been successful in invalidating Napa's ordinance-in particular, had the HBA been granted certiorari and succeeded in having the ordinance invalidated by the Supreme Court-it
would have greatly expanded the application of the Nollan/Dolantest
176.

Id. at 288.

177.
178.

Id.
Id.

179.

See id.

180.
rel, 456
181.
182.

See id.
at 283-84; Southern Burlington Township NAACP v. Township of Mt. LauA.2d 390, 448-50 (N.J. 1983).
See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60 (Ct. App. 2001).

183. Recent Case, Constitutional Law-Fifth Amendment Takings Clause-California Court
of Appeal Finds Nollan's and Dolan's Heightened Scrutiny Inapplicable to Inclusionary Zoning

Ordinance-Home Builders Ass'n of Northern California v. City of Napa, 108 Cal Rptr. 2d
60 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), 115 HIARv. L. R~v. 2058 (2002) [hereinafter Recent Case].
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to a generally applicable legislative requirement that required no dedication of property. In that sense, the case was largely declaratory of
existing law regarding the limited applicability of Nollan/Dolan to inclusionary ordinances. However, it confirmed that inclusionary zoning
can withstand a constitutional challenge and provided greater assurance to cities desiring to enact an inclusionary ordinance.
A.

The Case

1. The Parties
The HBA was represented by its chief counsel and by the Pacific
Legal Foundation ("PLF") .184 Both have been active in bringing litigation involving takings issues on behalf of developers and property
rights advocates. 18 5 PLF has filed a brief in favor of the property owner
in every important Supreme Court takings case. It has offices in five
states, a budget of $4 million, and, in 1998, had a litigation docket of
sixty takings cases.' 8 6 The National Association of Home Builders
("NAHB"), HBA's parent organization, represents residential developers and is one of the "nation's best organized and most powerful lob1 87
bying organizations."
The City of Napa, in the heart of Napa Valley's wine country, was
supported by several housing advocacy groups and six low-income individuals who intervened at the trial court level, 1 88 all represented by
the California Affordable Housing Law Project, Western Center on
Law and Poverty, and Legal Aid of Napa.18 9
184.
185.

See City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 61.
See Kendall & Lord, supra note 5, at 540-42, 545.
186. See id. at 541. On March 23, 2002, PLF's web site showed forty-eight land use
takings cases. Another thirty-eight were related to environmental laws, endangered species,
impact fees, and other land use matters. The NAHB, the Building Industry Association, or
local home builders associations were parties in eight of these cases. (Pacific Legal Foundation, at http://www.pacificlegal.org/libertywatch/) (last visited Mar. 23, 2002).
187. Kendall & Lord, supra note 5, at 545. Amicus briefs in support of HBA were filed
on behalf of the California Housing Council and the Apartment Association of Greater Los
Angeles. See City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
188. See Ciy of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 63 n.4.
189. See id. at 61. Intervenors included Napa Valley Community Housing, Non Profit
Housing Association of Northern California, and Housing California. Amicus briefs were
filed on behalf of the Napa Chamber of Commerce, Napa Valley Farm Bureau, Napa Valley
Grape Growers' Association, seventy-two California cities, and the California State Attorney
General. See id.
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The Napa Inclusionary Ordinance

The Napa ordinance's key provision was the requirement that ten
percent of all newly constructed residential units be affordable. 190 Developers who did not wish to provide the units as part of their development had several alternatives. Single-family home developers could, at
their sole discretion, pay in-lieu fees or make an "equivalent alternative proposal" such as the dedication of land. Developers of multi-family housing could propose the same alternatives, although these could
be approved only if the City Council found that they provided housing
opportunities equivalent to the basic ten percent requirement. 191 All
19 2
developers were given a variety of benefits, such as density bonuses,
and all could apply for a complete waiver of the inclusionary obligation "based upon the absence of any reasonable . . . nexus between
the impact of the development and . . . the inclusionary require193
ment."

The HBA made a facial challenge to the Napa ordinance-a difficult challenge to win. "A claim that a regulation is facially invalid is
only tenable if the terms of the regulation will not permit those who
administer it to avoid an unconstitutional application.... -194 Because
Napa's ordinance contained so many alternatives and possibilities for
various appeals, including the ability to apply for a complete waiver, it
would be difficult for any court to find that it must result in an unconstitutional application. In fact, here the court of appeal did find that,
since the city had the ability to completely waive the inclusionary re95
quirements, the ordinance could not result in a taking.1
3.

Takings Issues Raised and Their Disposition

HBA attacked the ordinance based on the Agins "substantially advance" standard typically applicable to a land use regulation. However,
190.

See NAPA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 15.94.050(A) (1999). Note that the definition of"af-

fordable" as used in the ordinance is complex but generally means that monthly payments
are limited to ensure that units are affordable to persons earning less than eighty percent
of the median income. See id.
191.

See id. § 15.94.050(B).

192. See id. § 15.94.050(F).
193. Id. § 15.94.080(A).
194. City ofNapa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 63 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. State
Water Res. Control Bd., 259 Cal. Rptr. 132, 146 (Ct. App. 1989)).
195. See City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 64.
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the major part of its briefing represented an effort to apply the Nollan/Dolan standard to a generally applicable zoning ordinance.1 9 6
a. The Agins Test
HBA claimed that the ordinance constituted a taking both be19 7
cause it failed to "substantially advance legitimate state interests"
and because Napa's own restrictive zoning had created the housing
shortage facing the City. 198 To show a legitimate state interest, the city,
intervenors and amici provided extensive documentation regarding
California cities' authority (and obligation) to foster affordable housing; evidence of the shortage of affordable housing both statewide
and in Napa; and the relationship between the ordinance's provisions
and Napa's goal of creating more affordable housing.1 99 In response
to HBA's specific claim that Napa's zoning had created the shortage
of affordable housing, the intervenors cited Pennsylvania Central Transportation Co. v. New York City200 for the proposition that there is a legitimate state interest in a land use regulation even if the problem being
addressed was caused by historical land use regulations. 20 1 Even if it
were true that inflated prices were caused by the City's policies, the
prime beneficiaries were the very landowners and developers repre20 2
sented by HBA.

The court of appeal had no difficulty dismissing this claim. "[W] e
have no doubt that creating affordable housing for low and moderate
income families is a legitimate state interest,"20 3 and "it is beyond
question" that the city's inclusionary ordinance would advance that
interest.20 4 Regarding the novel proposition that Napa could not
adopt the ordinance because its own actions had created the housing
shortage, the court agreed that there was no authority for the claim,
196. See Telephone Interview with Michael Rawson, Co-Director, The Public Interest
Law Project and California Affordable Housing Law Project, Oakland, Cal. (Nov. 12,
2001).
197. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr.2d at 64.
198.
199.

See id. at 66.
See id. at 64-65.
200. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
201. See Brief for Intervenors-Respondents at 26, City of Napa (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist.)
(No. A090437) (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 108).
202. See Brief for Intervenors-Respondents at 27.
203.
204.

City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 64.
Id. at 65.
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1003

and that in fact case law, such as Penn Central, was directly to the
20 5
contrary.
b.

Heightened Scrutiny Under the Nollan/Dolan Test

HBA's principal constitutional claim was that there was no way
that the construction of housing could create a need for affordable
housing, violating the Nollan/Dolan requirements that development
exactions be proportional to the project's impact. The HBA also contended that Napa's ordinance was a facially invalid taking because the
waiver provisions improperly put the burden on the developer to show
that a waiver should be granted, 20 6 contrary to Dolan's requirement
that the burden of justifying exactions be placed on the
207
government.
Relying largely on the California Supreme Court's earlier analysis
in Santa Monica Beach,2°18 the court of appeal agreed that the heightened Nollan/Dolan standard applies only in the "paradigmatic permit
context-where the individual property owner-developer seeks to negotiate approval of a planned development." 20 9 It does not apply
where the challenged legislation is "generally applicable to all development in [the] City." 210 In reaching this conclusion, the court contrasted generalized legislation to individualized negotiations with a
particular developer, where there is a "heightened risk of the 'extortionate' use of the police power." 21 1 The court in particular relied on
language in Santa Monica Beach that "individualized development fees
warrant a type of review akin to... Nollan and Dolan, whereas generally applicable development fees warrant the more deferential review
... generally accorded to legislative determinations."' 21 2 Ultimately,
the court established that, in California, as in NewJersey, an inclusionary ordinance does not need to meet the Nollan/Dolan test.
205. See id. at 66 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 108). The historic preservation ordinance at issue in Penn Central was itself designed to correct past New York City failures to
protect historic buildings. See id.
206.
207.
208.

See City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 64.
See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 n.8 (1994).
Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1999).
209. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 65 (quoting Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911
P.2d 429, 438 (Cal. 1996)).
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 66.
Id. at 65 (quoting Santa Monica Beach, 968 P.2d at 1002).
Id. at 65-66 (quoting Santa Monica Beach, 968 P.2d at 1002).

1004

B.
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Future Takings Challenges to Inclusionary Zoning

The court of appeal decision was a victory on nearly all counts for
the City of Napa. It showed that an inclusionary ordinance could withstand a facial challenge brought by well financed and experienced opponents. As one commentator stated, as a result of the decision, "[n] o
doubt, more cities and counties will enact inclusionary-type housing
ordinances to address the shortage of affordable housing."2 1 3 However, HBA's attorney considered it a "narrowly written ruling" that
does not preclude individual home builders from suing over inclusionary requirements once the provisions are applied to them (an "asapplied" challenge).214 In fact, HBA suggested that, in an as-applied
challenge, inclusionary zoning would likely be subject to "the height215
ened scrutiny standard . . . articulated in Nollan and Dolan."
This statement is almost certainly wrong. In California, if the inclusionary requirements are generally applicable and not individually
negotiated, they will not be subject to the Nollan/Dolantest. Nonetheless, there are potential takings issues, both on a facial and as-applied
basis, that could be raised in a future challenge.
1. Future Facial Challenges to Inclusionary Ordinances
The California Supreme Court, in its Santa Monica Beach and later
San Remo Hotel decisions, has, in relation to governmental fees, clearly
limited the Nollan/Dolantest to cases where individualized fees are negotiated with a single developer. 216 Fees imposed by "generally applicable legislation" and not aimed at a single developer are not subject
to heightened scrutiny. 2 17 In California, then, to survive a facial challenge, a local inclusionary ordinance need only meet the Agins tests by
substantially advancing legitimate state interests and not denying an
2 18
owner all economically beneficial or productive use of the land.
Demonstrating that an inclusionary ordinance "substantially advances
legitimate state interests" is relatively easy where state law, as in Cali213. Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., Residential Inclusion, SAN FRANCISCO DAILYJ. at 5 lJuly 20,
2001). See also summary of case in Development: In-Lieu Fee Substitutes for Affordable Housing,
REAL ESTATE L. REPORT, November 2001, at 7.

214.
215.
216.
tions of
217.
2002).
218.

See Serna, supra note 73.
Id.
See discussion supra p. 24. This may not be the case in regard to required dedicaland. See infra note 222.
See San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 104 (Cal.
See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
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fornia and New Jersey, creates an affirmative obligation on local gov21 9
ernments to provide affordable housing.
However, a rule exempting legislative actions from Nollan/Dolan
has not been reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. In fact, in
a dissent on a denial of certiorari to ParkingAss'n of Georgia, Inc. v. City
of Atlanta,220 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice O'Connor, wrote,
"[t] he distinction between sweeping legislative takings and particularized administrative takings appears to be one without a constitutional
difference." 221 Following this logic, it seems unlikely that the dedications of property required in Nollan and Dolan would have been upheld had they been imposed pursuant to legislative action. 222 The
court of appeal's decision in City of Napa (and, by implication, the
California Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area) has therefore
been criticized as providing insufficient protection to inclusionary ordinances from a future Nollan/Dolan challenge. Rather than relying
on a distinction between legislative and administrative actions, say critics, the court should have determined that "the inclusionary ordinance's required set-aside would not effect a taking if directly
imposed."223
219. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
220. 515 U.S. 1116 (1995).
221. Id. at 1118 (Thomas, J.,dissenting from denial of certiorari). The ordinance in
question required existing parking lots to install at least one tree for every eight parking
spaces and to devote ten percent of their surface area to landscaping-a typical land use
regulation. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the ordinance pursuant to Agins and
refused to apply Nollan/Dolan because it was not an individualized determination. See id. at
1116-17.
222. However, in San Remo Hotel, the California Supreme Court specifically distinguished payment of fees from the "exaction of an interest in real property" as occurred in
Nollan and Dolan, implying that Nollan/Dolan may apply to all dedications of real property,
even if legislatively imposed. See 41 P.3d at 106.
223. Recent Case, supra note 183, at 2063.This review suggests that a four-part test initially be applied to determine if an ordinance constitutes a taking: whether there is 1) a per
se physical taking (involving physical occupation); 2) a per se economic taking (no economically viable use); 3) a taking under the Penn Central multifactor test, see Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); or 4) a failure to "substantially
advance[ ] legitimate state interests" under Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. Only if the ordinance
constitutes a taking under one of these tests would it be subject to heightened scrutiny
under Nollan/Dolan, either in a facial challenge or an as-applied challenge. See Recent
Case, supra note 183, at 2063-65.
This analysis confuses the two prongs of a takings analysis. The heightened scrutiny
Nollan/Dolan test is used to determine whether the government's action is a "substantial
advancing of a legitimate state interest," see Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 841 (1987), not whether there is an economic taking. See also EdwardJ. Sullivan, Return
of the Platonic Guardians:Nollan and Dolan and the First ProngofAgins, 34 URn. LAw. 39, 41
(2002) ("Nollan and Dolan [are] founded exclusively on the first prong of the Agins
test. . . ."). Whether the test is used depends entirely on the nature of the government's
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Viewed another way, the question may be posed as: Is an inclusionary ordinance the type of governmental action that is subject to the
Nollan/Dolan test, or is it an exaction subject to the "reasonable relationship" test, or is it an ordinary land use regulation? This questionalthough it might be considered at the heart of the case-was, indeed,
not answered by the court.
In considering how other states or the federal courts may view
inclusionary ordinances, it appears most likely that the ordinances will
not be subject to the Nollan/Dolan test. Inclusionary ordinances do not
require the dedication of land. In fact, many do not even require the
payment of fees unless the developer chooses that option. Inclusionary ordinances are usually drafted as generally applicable legislative
actions that do not permit unfettered discretion by reviewing bodies.
Finally, the trend in the courts is to find that ordinances setting generally applicable fees are not subject to Nollan/Dolan.224 Inclusionary ordinances do not seem to be attractive vehicles for the expansion of the
Nollan/Dolan test.
A closer question is whether inclusionary ordinances will be considered exactions subject to the "reasonable relationship" test. In City
of Napa, this intermediate standard was never considered by the court
of appeal because California's Mitigation Fee Act 22 5 requires all challenges to be made after the fee is paid,2 26 and HBA made a pre-development facial challenge. 227 The City of Napa and amicus argued that
the in-lieu fees permitted by the ordinance were not impact fees as
defined by the Act because the underlying inclusionary requirement
was not a monetary exaction, fees were paid only at the election of the
developer, and the fees did not pay for public facilities as defined in
action, rather than on its economic impact. Note that in Nollan, the Court agreed that the
Coastal Commission could have required the Nollans to dedicate the beach easement had
the required dedication actually advanced the state's asserted interest. The dedication did
not create an economic taking; rather, it did not "substantially advance" the state's interest.
See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37. The Court has imposed the test only when reviewing required dedications of property, see supra pages 21-24, and has stated in dicta that it applies
only to "exactions." See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702
(1999). Thus, the issue is whether inclusionary requirements are exactions subject to the
Nollan/Dolantest, not whether they are "takings." In addition, the Penn Centraltest is almost
never appropriate when reviewing an ordinance on its face; rather, it is an "essentially ad
hoc, factual inquirty]" generally utilized in an as-applied challenge. Penn Central, 438 U.S.
at 124.
224. See Ziegler, supra note 117, at 164-65 n.51.
225. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66000 (West Supp. 2002).
226. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66020(d)(1) (West Supp. 2002).
227. See Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 63 (Ct. App. 2001).
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the Mitigation Fee Act. 228 However, in San Remo Hotel, the California

Supreme Court reviewed a similar in-lieu fee under the "reasonable
relationship" test.22 9 There, the San Francisco ordinance gave the developer the choice of replacing each room lost on a one-for-one basis
or paying a fee equal to the cost of a replacement site plus a portion
of the new construction costs. 230 Like Napa's inclusionary ordinance,
the hotel conversion ordinance's underlying requirement was not a
monetary exaction, fees were paid only at the election of the developer, and the fees did not pay for public facilities. Nonetheless, it was
considered to be an impact fee-a type of exaction-subject to the
"reasonable relationship" test.
It may be possible to distinguish the residential hotel fee in San
Remo Hotel from a typical inclusionary fee: the San Remo Hotel fee was
imposed because of the impact of residential hotel conversions, while
an inclusionary requirement is designed to regulate new development. However, inclusionary ordinances look like exactions when they
allow developers to pay fees in lieu of actually constructing affordable
units (as was the case with the San Remo Hotel). If the inclusionary
requirement can be met by paying a fee-which is clearly an exaction-then perhaps the inclusionary requirement itself is an exaction.
The optional fee payment may distinguish these ordinances from typical zoning and planning requirements such as maximum height and
minimum setbacks. Cities do not generally allow developers to pay a
fee in lieu of limiting building height, for example. If a challenger
were successful in characterizing inclusionary zoning as an exaction,
then a city would need to show a "reasonable relationship" between
the affordability requirements and the project's impacts. This is the
23 1
facial challenge most likely to succeed.
228. See Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent City of Napa at 9, City of
Napa (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist.) (No. A090437); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Defendant City of Napa's Demurrer at 17, Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa
(Napa County Super. Ct.) (No. 26-07228).
229. See San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal.
2002).
230. See id. at 92.
231. Even some authors supportive of inclusionary zoning believe that they could be
considered to be exactions. See, e.g., Merrill & Lincoln, supra note 20, at 274 (stating that
inclusionary ordinances may be considered exactions because they require the developer
to provide a "public good" and may allow him to pay fees to avoid specific restrictions). See
also discussion supra note 25. In California, because of the requirements of California's
Mitigation Fee Act, see supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text, any challenge based on
a contention that the ordinance is an impact fee must be brought in an as-applied challenge after the fees have been paid under protest.
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Future As-Applied Challenges to Inclusionary Ordinances

In California, so long as an inclusionary ordinance is generally
applicable to a class of projects and leaves local officials with "no
meaningful .

.

. discretion," the Nollan/Dolan test will not be utilized

even in an as-applied challenge. 232 Only if a local inclusionary ordinance requires developers to negotiate individually, with meaningful
discretion applied by the government, would Nollan/Dolan apply to a
particular project. In the City of Napa, for example, a developer may
233
negotiate with the city for individualized concessions and incentives
and may also negotiate for an "alternative equivalent action" 23 4 if she
does not want to provide the affordable housing or in-lieu fees specified in the ordinance. Conceivably, such an individualized bargain
could be challenged and reviewed under the heightened scrutiny
specified in Nollan/Dolan.235 However, in reality, this is unlikely to happen. A city faced with a developer who had requested an "alternative
equivalent action" and then objected to the bargain would most probably simply tell the developer to comply with the non-discretionary
standards included in the ordinance by providing the units on-site or
paying established fees.
Napa's ordinance permits all inclusionary requirements to be
completely waived if a developer can show that there is no nexus between his project and the city's inclusionary requirements. 23 6 Relying
on this language-which was construed by the HBA as an admission
by Napa that Nollan's "essential nexus" standard 237 applies-the HBA
stated its intent to bring an as-applied challenge. 238 If a developer
were to provide a study showing that his project does not create a
demand for affordable housing, and that there is consequently no
nexus between the inclusionary requirement and the project, the City
of Napa could be forced to prepare an expensive nexus study of its
own to rebut the assertion. 239 An easier solution is simply to modify
the waiver provision to base the waiver on grounds other than lack of
232. San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 104.
233. See NAPA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 15.94.050(F).
234. Id. § 15.94.050(B).
235. See Recent Case, supra note 183, at 2061 n.33 (describing the typical cost of nexus
studies as $20,000-$35,000). See also infra Part V.C. for a description of possible nexus
studies.
236. See NAPA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 15.94.080(A) (1999).
237. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); e-mail from
Thomas B. Brown, City Attorney, Napa, to Barbara Kautz (Aug. 23, 2002, 21:03 PDT).
238. See Serna, supra note 73.
239. See Recent Case, supra note 183, at 2061-62.
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a nexus. While the waiver did help Napa's ordinance survive a facial
challenge, 240 a waiver based on other criteria would enable an ordinance to survive a facial challenge without suggesting that Nollan's
24 1
nexus analysis is appropriate.
There is the final issue of finding an applicant to bring an "asapplied" lawsuit. In Napa, numerous developers have complied with
the terms of the ordinance both before and after the lawsuit. In most
cases, the cost of a lawsuit would be far greater than the cost of compliance. Developers also risk destroying their relationship with a community by bringing a lawsuit. The Napa ordinance has been in place
242
for three years, and no developer has yet brought such a suit.

3.

Penn Central: The Final Takings Test

The final test that is often used in an "as-applied" takings claim is
the Penn Centrat2 43 multifactor test. In 1978, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the economic impact of New York's Landmarks
Preservation Law as it applied to Grand Central Station 244 and established a three-factor test to decide if there had been a taking: analysis
of (1) the "economic impact of the regulation on the claimant;" (2)
"the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations;" and (3) the "character of the government
action," all reviewed in an "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiry. '2 4 5 The
Court found that Penn Central's property had not been taken even
though its value had decreased substantially as a result of the regulation. 246 As one commentator has observed, "[t] here are few successful
2 47
Penn Central takings claims as a practical matter.
So long as the adoption of an inclusionary ordinance is accompanied by an economic study demonstrating that the requirements are
reasonable and allow an economically viable use, it is highly unlikely
that a Penn Centralchallenge will be able to establish a substantial economic impact or interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations. The Penn Central Court noted, for instance, that it had
240.
241.

See Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 64 (Ct. App. 2001).
See discussion infra Part V.D.3.

242. See Telephone Interview with Thomas B. Brown, City Attorney, Napa, Cal. (Mar.
29, 2002).
243. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
244. See id. at 108.
245. Id. at 124.
246. See id. at 138.
247. Wendie L. Kellingham, New Takes on Old Takes: A Takings Law Update, 2001
ALI-ABA LAND USE INST. 511, 515 (2001).
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approved land use controls resulting in 75 to 87.5 percent diminution
in value; 248 by comparison, one study of a twenty percent inclusionary
requirement (substantially higher than is usual) showed a diminution
in land value of forty percent. 249 The character of the government
action is the imposition of rent and price controls-a permissible governmental action recognized by the courts. The requirements would
need to be much more draconian before Penn Central would likely
apply. In City of Napa, the HBA stated explicitly that it did not believe
that the ordinance constituted an economic taking under the Penn
Central test.

IV.

250

Inclusionary Housing Viewed As Rent and Price Controls

An inclusionary ordinance controls the sale price or rent of some
of the housing built by a developer. It is possible, then, to view the
ordinance as a form of rent or price control, rather than as an ordinance regulating the use of land. If viewed in that way, inclusionary
ordinances will be subject to an entirely separate area of constitutional
and statutory restrictions.
A.

Is an Inclusionary Ordinance a Rent Control Ordinance?

In City of Napa, HBA argued that the ordinance was a rent control
ordinance 25 ' and that it violated the Due Process Clause 252 because it
required the sale or rental of ten percent of housing units at a fixed
price without any provision for a fair return on investment to the developer. 253 The City responded that its ordinance was not a rent or
price control but rather a land use ordinance and that "fair return"
standards had never been applied to applicants attempting to develop
property. 254 While never specifically dealing with HBA's contention
that Napa's ordinance was rent control, the court of appeal agreed
that there was no case that held that a housing developerwas entitled to
248. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131.
249. See Impact Evaluation, supra note 91, at 5.
250. See Petitioner's Reply to the Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7 n.6,
Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 122 S. Ct. 1356 (2002) (No. 01-893).
251. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28, Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 122
S. Ct. 1356 (2002) (No. 01-893).
252. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
253. See Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 67 (Ct. App. 2001).
254. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant City of
Napa's Demurrer at 19, Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa (Napa County Super. Ct.)
(No. 26-7228).
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a fair rate of return. 25 5 Further, under the specific provisions of the
Napa ordinance, no developer was actually required to rent units or to
sell them at a reduced price; the developer instead could choose to
25 6
build the units, donate vacant land or pay in-lieu fees.
There are several rationales for distinguishing inclusionary ordinances from rent control. 257 These include inclusionary zoning's remedial character as a response to exclusionary zoning; its application
to new development only rather than to existing apartments; its inclusion of both rental and owner housing; and its screening of owners
and tenants (at least initially) to ensure that they are lower income
households. 258 The difficulty is that inclusionary ordinances, do, on
their face, limit rents.
The Colorado Supreme Court found that a similar ordinance
was, indeed, a rent control law. 259 The Town of Telluride adopted an
ordinance requiring developers to create housing affordable to forty
percent of the employees generated by the development. The developer could satisfy the requirement by constructing new housing with
controlled rents, paying fees, or dedicating land. 260 Even though the
developer was not required to provide rent-controlled units, the Colorado court found that the Telluride ordinance set a base rent and
then strictly limited rent increases and that the "scheme as a whole
' 261
operate[d] to suppress rental values below their market values."
The court found that the ordinance violated the "plain language" of
262
and struck it down. 263
the Colorado statute prohibiting rent control
Even the New Jersey Supreme Court, when deciding Mt. Laurel
recognized that the limitations on rents imposed by inclusionary
ordinances could be a type of rent control. The court suggested that
rent increases permissible in affordable units as tenants' incomes in11,264

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 67.
See id.
See Mallakh, supra note 31, at 1872-76.
See id.
See Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture L.L.C., 3 P. 3d 30, 35 (Colo.

2000).
260. See id. at 32.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See id at 32. In a dissent, Chief Justice Mullarkey argued vigorously that the Telluride ordinance was a land use control, pointing out that it was impact-related and designed
to meet other Colorado planning goals and did not apply to existing rental units, as would
a typical rent control ordinance. See id. at 42-44 (Mullarkey, C.J., dissenting).
264. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390
(N.J. 1983).
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creased would generally parallel normal rent increases permitted
under a rent control ordinance, ensuring that the owners would
265
achieve a fair return.
Although the court of appeal in City of Napa did not find Napa's
inclusionary ordinance to be a rent control ordinance, the question
was not clearly presented, and other courts may do so. In that case,
inclusionary ordinances may be vulnerable to constitutional doctrines
and state laws related to rent control.
B.

Do Inclusionary Ordinances Give a Fair Rate of Return?
A price control is generally considered constitutional so long as it

is not "confiscatory, i.e ..... fail [s] to permit a landlord a fair rate of

return." 266 Put another way, courts usually uphold a price control so
long as it does not deprive investors of a fair return. 267 However,
prices and rents in inclusionary units are usually not based on "fair
return" concepts. Instead, inclusionary ordinances most typically base
prices and rents on those that are affordable to lower income families.
California law, for instance, states that units are affordable to lower
income families if they do not exceed thirty percent of sixty percent of
area median income. 268 As one example, a three-person lower income
family in Oakland, California could be charged no more than $1,117
per month for rent,2

69

regardless of the developer's actual construc-

tion costs. These set rents have nothing to do with taxes, maintenance
costs, insurance, mortgage rates, construction costs, or other factors
that affect the landlord's rate of return.
In Pennell v. City of San Jose,270 the United States Supreme Court
reviewed a constitutional challenge to a San Jose, California, rent control ordinance based on a provision that permitted the City to consider
"hardship to a tenant" when setting rents27 1-a provision that could
be considered akin to basing rents on tenant incomes, rather than on
landlord costs. In the case of the provision reviewed in Pennell, however, there was no requirement that the rents be reduced based on ten265. See id. at 446 n.30.
266. Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d 993, 998 (Cal. 1999).
267. See id. at 999.
268. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65915(c).
269. This figure is based on a median income of $74,500 for a three-person family.
Sixty percent of median income equals $44,700/year, or $3,725/month. Thirty percent of
monthly income equals $1,117/month.
270. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
271. See id, at 4.
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ant hardship.

The

Court

held

that the

provision

2 72
unconstitutional absent any evidence of its actual impact.

was

not

Pennell appears to stand for the proposition that rent controls
cannot be challenged on their face unless they actually deny a landlord a fair return. However, a court might choose to overturn an inclusionary ordinance that sets rents and prices based on no consideration
of the landlord's rate of return. There are two possible defenses. First,
as in City of Napa, cities may persuade the courts that inclusionary ordinances are land use regulations rather than rent control, and that a
developer has no right to a "fair rate of return." 273 Second, under the
recently decided Tahoe-SierraPreservationCouncil v. Tahoe RegionalPlanning Agency, 274 the economic impact of a regulation must be deter-

mined in relation to the project as a whole, not in terms of its effect
on only a part of the project-in this case, the impact on the small
percentage of inclusionary units.275 A restriction on the use of a small
part of a property is not a taking per se,2 7 6 even if the developer has an
inadequate rate of return on the inclusionary units. Instead, the case
can be applied to hold that inclusionary requirements will constitute a
taking only if the owner is deprived of all economic value when the
property is viewed as a whole-including both the market-rate and the
inclusionary units.
C.

Premium Pricing

An inclusionary ordinance that does not limit the resale prices of
for-sale units (creating "premium pricing" for the first buyer) may be
vulnerable to attack for "not advancing a legitimate state interest." Orange County, California's inclusionary ordinance initially did not control the resale prices of single-family homes after they were first sold at
an affordable price. 2 77 If a house were sold for a price that was, say,
$50,000 less than its market value, the first buyer could sell it at the
market price and pocket the premium-in effect, transferring the
272. See id. at 15. Justice Scalia, however, would have found the ordinance to be facially
unconstitutional based on this section alone. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
273. See Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 67 (Ct. App. 2002).
274. No. 00-1167 (U.S. Supreme Ct., filed Apr. 23, 2002).
275. See id., slip. op. at 27-28 ("An interest in real property is defined by the metes and
bounds that describe its geographic dimensions.... Hence, a permanent deprivation of
the owner's use of the entire area is a taking of the parcel as a whole.
) (emphasis
added).
276. See id., slip op. at 23.
277. See Calavita & Grimes, supra note 53, at 160.
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$50,000 from the developer to the first buyer but not creating affordable housing, the ostensible purpose of the ordinance.
In Yee v. City of Escondido,2 78 the United States Supreme Court
considered a similar scheme that had the effect of permitting the existing tenants of a mobile home park to appropriate the entire difference between the market price and the rent-controlled pricebenefiting only the tenant in possession at the time rent control was
imposed. 279 In dicta, the Court noted that "[t]his effect might have
some bearing on whether the ordinance causes a regulatory taking, as
it may shed some light on whether there is a sufficient nexus between
the effect of the ordinance and the objectives it is supposed to
28
advance. " 11
The Ninth Circuit has applied this dictum to find that rent control ordinances that permit the "capture of a premium" by a tenant
may not "substantially advance a legitimate state interest" and so may
constitute a taking. In Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 28 1 the
Ninth Circuit found that a Honolulu ordinance that restricted the
land rent charged to condominium owners-but did not restrict the
prices of the condominiums-merely transferred part of the value of
the land from the landowner to the condominium owner and thus did
28 2
not advance the legitimate goal of creating affordable housing.
Similarly, in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Cayetano,283 Chevron alleged that a
Hawaii statute limiting the rents it could charge service stations permitted the operator "to sell his leasehold at a premium."28 34 The Ninth
Circuit agreed that this stated a valid claim for a taking under Yee and
28 5
Richardson.
Inclusionary ordinances may avoid this problem simply by requiring that units remain affordable for some period of years. Of the ordinances reviewed for this article, the minimum period of affordability
was twenty years (where the term of affordability could be determined). Such a substantial period of time-almost a generationlikely avoids any "premium pricing" issue.
278. 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
279. See id. at 530.
280. Id. The Court did not decide whether this provision resulted in a taking because it
had granted certiorari only to determine whether the ordinance created a physical taking.
See id. See also Merrill & Lincoln, supra note 20, at 280 n.295.
281. 124 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1997).
282. See id. at 1165-66.
283. 224 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2000).
284. Id. at 1033.
285. See id. at 1037.
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Conflicts with State Statutes Related to Rent Control

Some states have adopted statutes setting limits on local governments' ability to adopt rent control ordinances. The Telluride, Colorado, inclusionary ordinance was found to be void because it
conflicted with a statewide Colorado ban on rent control. 286 In California, the statewide Costa-Hawkins Act, 28 7 adopted in 1995 to regulate local rent control, may directly conflict with inclusionary
ordinances. 288 Cities' experiences with Costa-Hawkins and the Colorado legislation illustrate the significant changes that cities may need
to make in their inclusionary zoning ordinances to respond to state
rent control laws.
Two provisions of the Costa-Hawkins Act may be inconsistent with
inclusionary ordinances requiring affordable rental housing. First,
under Costa-Hawkins, the owner of any rental unit has the right to set
the initial rent 289-rather than having the initial rent determined
based on its affordability to a lower income family. Second, under
Costa-Hawkins, the owner has the right to set the rent whenever a
tenant vacates the unit29 0 -often referred to as "vacancy decontrol." 291 This provision also conflicts with inclusionary ordinances,
which require that rents remain affordable to lower income tenants
and tie rent increases to increases in median income.
Whether Costa-Hawkins was intended to apply to inclusionary ordinances is unclear. 2 92 Only one exception is included in the bill:
286. See Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture LLC, 3 P.3d 30, 35 (Colo. 2000);
supra notes 259-63 and accompanying text.
287. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1954.50 (West Supp. 2002).
288. See generally Mallakh, supra note 31 (discussing in detail whether Costa-Hawkins
applies to inclusionary zoning ordinances).
289. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1954.52(a) (West Supp. 2002) ("Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, an owner of residential real property may establish the initial ... rental
rates for a dwelling or unit ... ").
290. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1954.52 (a) (3) (C) (ii) (West Supp. 2002) ("[A] n owner of real
property . . . may establish the initial and all subsequent rental rates for all new
tenancies. .. ").

291. See Mallakh, supra note 31, at 1850-51.
292. A participant in the legislative debates on Costa-Hawkins states that Costa-Hawkins
proponents specifically asserted that the bill would not cover inclusionary units. However,
he acknowledges that no such agreement is reflected in the legislative history. See Telephone Interview with Michael Rawson, Co-Director, The Public Interest Law Project and
California Affordable Housing Law Project, Oakland, Cal. (Nov. 12, 2001). See also Mallakh,
supra note 31, at 1870-72. Mallakh also discusses the numerous statements of the bill's
authors that Costa-Hawkins would affect only the five California cities that did not permit
vacancy decontrol (Berkeley, Santa Monica, West Hollywood, Cotati, and East Palo Alto),
see id. at 1870 n.149, and notes that nowhere in the legislative history was the act described
as having a "prohibitive effect" on inclusionary programs. See id. at 1871 n.154.
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"where the owner has otherwise agreed by contract with a public entity in consideration for a direct financial contribution or any other
forms of assistance specified in [the Density Bonus law]."293 If a project receives a density bonus or other assistance under the Density Bonus law, 29 4 then cities can clearly require that the rents be controlled.
It is also possible to interpret section 1954.52(b) as exempting from
Costa-Hawkins any inclusionary housing given a financial contribution
or other form of assistance that is discussed in the Density Bonus law,
whether or not the incentive was actually given pursuant to the Density Bonus law. In other words, if inclusionary housing receives any
one of the forms of assistance specified in the Density Bonus lawmixed-use zoning and parking concessions, for instance-then it may
295
be exempt from Costa-Hawkins.
There are no appellate court cases regarding the applicability of
the Costa-Hawkins Act to inclusionary housing programs. It is fairly
debatable whether a court would apply Costa-Hawkins to an inclusionary ordinance. The strongest argument in favor of applying it to an
inclusionary ordinance is the fact that inclusionary zoning does, indeed, regulate rents. 29 6 Arguments against applying Costa-Hawkins

would likely define an inclusionary ordinance as a land use ordinance,
not a rent control ordinance. 297 Given the affirmative duty of cities in
California to plan for "adequate sites" for affordable housing, 29 8 the
California courts may be more likely than the Colorado court to classify an inclusionary requirement as a land use regulation following the
lead of the New Jersey Supreme Court. 299 However, if Costa-Hawkins
does indeed apply to rent-controlled inclusionary units, and section
293. Cal. Civ. Code § 1954.52(b) (2001).
294. See Cal. Gov't Code §§ 65915-65918 (West Supp. 2002). The Density Bonus law
requires cities and counties to grant at least two incentives (or other incentives of
"equivalent" financial value) for any housing development that includes a specified percentage of affordable housing:
Twenty percent affordable to lower income households; or
Ten percent affordable to very low income households; or
Fifty percent occupied by senior citizens.
See id. If a city does not choose to give financial assistance to the developer, it must grant

him a twenty-five percent density bonus over that normally allowed by a city's zoning ordinance or comprehensive plan, see Cal. Gov't Code § 65915(f), plus one other incentive,
generally a regulatory concession such as lower parking requirements, faster processing,

lower fees, etc. See Cal. Gov't Code § 65915(h).
295. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65915(h).
296. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1954.52(b) (West Supp. 2002); Mallakh, supra note 31, at
1865-68.

297. See Mallakh, supra note 31, at 1869-76; supra Part IV.A.
298. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65583(c) (1) (A) (West Supp. 2002).
299. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
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1954.52(b) is interpreted as exempting only inclusionary units that
comply with the state's Density Bonus law, then only inclusionary units
complying with the Density Bonus law would comply with CostaHawkins.
In 1998, the Santa Monica Housing sought a declaratory judgment that the City of Santa Monica's ordinance was preempted by the
Costa-Hawkins Act. 30 0 Subsequently, the City amended its inclusionary

ordinance to permit two primary ways for developers of rental housing
to meet their affordable housing obligation:
1. Pay an "affordable housing fee" to provide funds for the construction of affordable housing; or
2. Develop affordable units onsite that qualify for a density bonus
under the State's Density Bonus Law. Onsite inclusionary units do
not fulfill the city's inclusionary requirements unless they qualify for a

30 1
density bonus under state law.
In response to Telluride, the City of Boulder, Colorado also amended
its ordinance to comply with state law regarding rent control. The Colorado legislature had exempted from its ban on rent control, all
properties in which a city "ha[d] an interest through a housing authority or similar agency." 30 2 After Telluride, Boulder amended its ordinance to require that the housing authority or similar agency have an
interest in all affordable rental units provided under Boulder's inclu30 3
sionary ordinance.
In both of these cases, localities managed to modify their inclusionary programs to comply with state laws regarding rent control. Santa
Monica's ordinance is a model for avoiding conflicts with Costa-Hawkins, while Boulder's ordinance no longer conflicts with Colorado's
statute. However, if most developers in Santa Monica choose to pay
fees instead of building affordable units, the City of Santa Monica will
be responsible for finding sites for future affordable housing projects
and for finding developers or non-profit sponsors to build the unitsrequiring much more time and effort by the city than if the units were
supplied by the developer. Boulder must make arrangements with its
local housing authority to keep rental units affordable. The state rent
control statutes have complicated both programs and rendered them
less effective.
300. See Mallakh, supra note 31, at 1851. After Santa Monica amended its ordinance,
the lawsuit became moot. See id.
301. See SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 9.56.040 (1998).
302. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-301 (2001).
303. See BOULDER, COLO., REv. CODE, § 9-6.5-3 (2000); CITY OF BOULDER, COLO., CmTY
COUNCIL AGENDA ITEM 11 (Jan. 2, 2001), available at http://www.ci.boulder.co.us/clerk/
previous/2001/010102/1l.htmI (last visited Apr. 19, 2002).
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Guidelines for Practitioners

There is now an inclusionary zoning ordinance that has withstood a recent appellate court test. Features of Napa's ordinance that
were cited approvingly by the court of appeal included its extensive
factual record (with nearly 700 pages of reports and supporting documentation) ;304 the incentives for compliance; the variety of ways to
comply with the ordinance; and the ability of applicants to obtain a
complete waiver from the ordinance's provisions.30 5 Further, in California, these generally applicable ordinances will not be subject to
heightened scrutiny; the highest level of scrutiny would be the "rea306
sonable relationship" test.
An approach that may be worth considering in drafting future
inclusionary ordinances is to position them more clearly as either exactions or land use regulations. Most inclusionary ordinances are
neither fish nor fowl. They appear to be exactions because in-lieu fees
can be paid to comply with the ordinance-inviting the courts "to
3 °7
treat the entire inclusionary program as a development exaction."
They also appear to be exactions when they provide incentives to developers in exchange for the inclusionary units-yet keep the incentives small in relation to the restrictions on the inclusionary units. At
the same time, most communities assert that inclusionary ordinances
are not an exaction and don't complete the kind of "nexus" or even
"reasonable relationship" study that would make them less vulnerable
to a future challenge.
There are three approaches to drafting inclusionary ordinances
that are most likely to withstand future takings challenges:
1.

2.

Draft an ordinance-like that in Montgomery County, Maryland 3 0 8-with a large enough density bonus to compensate
developers for the restricted prices.
Draft an ordinance-like the Housing Element policy in San
Mateo, California)O--that looks like an ordinary land use
regulation because it allows no in-lieu fees and contains no
incentives.

304. See Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 63 (Ct. App. 2001).
305. See id. at 64.
306. See discussion supra Part II.B.
307. Judd & Rosen, supra note 9, at 7.
308. See MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE, ch. 25A (2002); MONTGOMERY COUNTY,
supra note 41.
309. See SAN MATEO, CAL., CITY OF SAN MATEO HOUSING ELEMENT H2.3-H2.5 (2002)
[hereinafter SAN MATEO HOUSING ELEMENT].
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Draft an ordinance-like that in Santa Monica, Califor-

nia 3 1°0-that treats inclusionary requirements like impact fees
and complete the needed nexus studies.
A.

The Density Bonus Approach

Even the harshest critics of inclusionary zoning, such as Robert
Ellickson, concede that high enough density bonuses create affordable units at no cost to landowners, developers, or other homeowners. 31 1 If the goal is truly to create affordable housing, a density bonus
will create the greatest number of affordable units, generate the largest overall housing supply, and maintain rates of return for developers. 312 Montgomery County, Maryland's ordinance comes closest to
meeting these goals.
The density bonus was designed to preclude developers from losing opportunities to build market-rate units and to help offset
some of the production costs of the MPDUs [Moderately Priced
Dwelling Units]. The law presently requires that between 12.5 and
15 percent of the total number of units.. .be moderately priced.
.. The zoning ordinance allows a density increase up to 22 percent
above the normal density permitted under the zone ....
The density bonus, in 13effect, creates free lots upon which the MPDUs are
3
constructed.
Montgomery County, with a population of 819,000 in 1996, has created more than 10,100 affordable units. 3 14 By comparison, all of the
programs in the state of California, which has a population roughly 30
times as large, have together created about 25,000 units. 3 15 The difference? Few inclusionary programs in California have meaningful incentives 3 6-most likely due to community opposition to higher densities.
Density bonuses great enough to avoid costs to any of the parties will
not only avoid a future takings challenge, but will also provide the
most affordable housing-the goal of the program.
B.

The Pure Land Use Regulation Approach

San Mateo, California, requires that ten percent of all residential
projects having eleven or more units be made affordable to either lowor moderate-income families. This requirement was part of an initia310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

See SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 9.56 (1998).
See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1180.
See Dietderich, supra note 20, at 28.
MONTGOMERY CoUNTY, supra note 41.
See id.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
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tive adopted by the voters in 1990. 3 17 It includes no density bonuses

except those required by state law and specifically states that in-lieu
318
fees are not an acceptable alternative to providing units on-site.
The provisions cannot be waived because they are required by the
319
city's general plan, and all development must conform to the plan.

This approach appears most similar to a land use regulation. Like
traditional zoning limitations on height, setbacks, and floor area,
these policies simply regulate the use of a small portion of the property, and applicants are expected to comply with the provisions. With
no in-lieu fees, this requirement looks like a land use regulation, not
an exaction.
C.

The Pure Exactions Approach

The City of Santa Monica chose to levy an impact fee on most
new market-rate housing developments (although developers may, in
some cases, have the option of providing the units off- or on-site).320
To justify the fee, the city completed a nexus study32 1 that looked at
the impact of new, market-rate housing on the demand for affordable
housing. It calculated the demand for goods and services created by
new residents of market-rate housing; the number of low- and moderate-wage workers needed to satisfy that demand; and the cost of producing affordable housing needed by those workers.3 22 The report
concluded that an impact fee of $5.41 to $8.01 per square foot was
needed to provide housing for the low-income workers who would
serve the residents of the new market-rate homes.3 23 As a further justification for the fee, Santa Monica included in its findings, but did not
317. See CITY OF SAN MATEO, CAL., VISION 2010: SAN MATEO GENERAL PLAN, app. R
§ 3(D) (5) (b) (1990) [hereinafter SAN MATEO GENERAL PLAN].
318. See SAN MATEO HOUSING ELEMENT, supra note 309, at H2.4.
319. See SAN MATEO GENERAL PLAN, supra note 317, Policy LU 6A.1 at 11-30.
320.

See SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 9.56.040 (1998).
See HAMILTON, RABINOVITZ & ALSCHULER, INC, THE NEXUS BETWEEN NEW MARKET
RATE MULTI-FAMILY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CITY OF SANTA MONICA AND THE NEED FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING (July 7, 1998) (on file at the University of San Francisco Law Review
office) [hereinafter HR&A REPORT].
322. See CITy OF SANTA MONICA, CAL., ITEM 9-A, SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL STAFF REPORT
(June 9, 1998), available at http://www.santa-monica.org/cityclerk/council/agendas/

321.

1998/s98060909-A/html (last visited Mar. 24, 2002).
323. See HR&A REPORT, supra note 321, at 6. See also KEYSER MARSTON ASSOCIATES, INC.,

A-6 (Apr.
1995) (concluding that at least 7.05 workers with moderate-income wages or below would
be supported by the retail expenditures of every 100 houses and calculating an impact fee
PALO ALTO BMR PROGRAM RESIDENTIAL NEXUS: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

based on this ratio) (on file at the University of San Francisco Law Review office) [hereinafter KMA REPORT].
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quantify, an assertion that impact fees are needed because market-rate
housing consumes land that will no longer be available for affordable
housing. 3 24 Santa Monica anticipated that most developers would pay
a fee rather than construct affordable housing on-site; anticipated that
the fee might be attacked as an exaction; and completed studies to
show a nexus between the fee and the impacts of new housing on
affordable housing. As a generally applicable fee, Santa Monica's
housing fee-and any similar fee-would likely be reviewed under the
"reasonable relationship" standard established by the California
courts. The nexus study completed by Santa Monica is an excellent
model for cities that want to acknowledge inclusionary requirements
and in-lieu fees as impact fees.
D.

Other Advice for Practitioners

1. Establish an Adequate Factual Record
A city will better survive any type of challenge if it has empirical
data to justify its policy judgments. (Napa had 700 pages of documents.) Some of the studies that may be particularly useful in the context of inclusionary ordinances are those listed here.
a.

Demonstrate the Need for Affordable Housing in the
Community and Its Relationship to the Affordability
Requirements in the Ordinance

In California, regional agencies calculate each community's 'fair
share' of the regional housing need every five years, dividing the total
housing demand into that needed by various income groups. 325 In
New Jersey, the Council on Affordable Housing has established detailed standards for affordable housing in each community. 326 Consol324. See SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 9.56.010(f). The Santa Monica ordinance
contains an excellent set of findings that can be used as a model by drafters of future
inclusionary ordinances. Id. at § 9.56.010. See also Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Township of
Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 285 (N.J. 1990) ("Land must be viewed as an essential but exhaustible resource; any land that is developed for any purpose reduces the supply of land capable of being used to build affordable housing."); Merrill & Lincoln, supra note 20, at
285-87 (describing an economic methodology showing a link between the construction of
market-rate housing and reduced opportunities for affordable housing); KMA REPORT,
supra note 323, at 6 ("[T]he construction of market-rate housing means a lost opportunity
to build below-market-rate housing."). See generally MUNDIE & Assocs. ET AL., AN INCLUSIONARY HOUSING STRATEGY FOR MENDOCINO COUNTY (Nov. 1995) (on file at the University of
San Francisco Law Review office) (quantifying affordable housing needs based in part on
limited land available for affordable units).
325. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65584(a) (West Supp. 2002).
326. See Calavita et. al., supra note 1, at 112.
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idated Plans required by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development as a condition of federal Community Development
Block Grants and other housing grants also document housing
needs. 32 7 All these will allow a city to demonstrate that there is a need
for affordable housing in the community and that the required affordable housing "substantially advances a legitimate state interest[ ]."32s
b.

Demonstrate the Economic Feasibility of Residential
Development After Passage of the Ordinance
A city should demonstrate that the requirements are not so oner-

ous as to deny the owner "all economically viable use" 329 and that the

economic impact is limited so as not to interfere with "investmentbacked expectations. ' '3311 It may help as well to show that an inclusionary ordinance will not reduce the amount of housing constructed, to
demonstrate that the ordinance in fact "advances" the city's interest in
affordable housing.
2.

Minimize Discretion

In California and some other states, the Nollan/Dolantest will not
apply to a generally applicable fee but may well apply to individually
negotiated fees. The required details-percent of units required, affordability level, resale provisions, deed restrictions, physical standards
for the affordable units, price and rent levels, selection of tenants and
buyers-all should be determined in advance of implementing the ordinance so that the requirements are generally applicable rather than
individually negotiated.
3.

Consider Including a Hardship Waiver

The City of Napa court found that since Napa could grant a complete waiver from the inclusionary zoning ordinance, the ordinance
could not result in a taking.3 3 ' A waiver provision, then, can provide
strong assurance that an inclusionary ordinance can withstand a facial
challenge. The difficulty, however, lies in determining the basis for a
complete waiver. Zoning and land use ordinances typically permit variances if the usual zoning requirements will cause a hardship. A typical
327. See U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urb. Dev., Consolidated Plan, at http://www.hud.gov/
progdesc/conplan.cfm (Jan. 23, 2002) (last accessed July 22, 2002).
328. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
329. Id.
330. Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
331. See Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 64 (Ct. App. 2001).
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provision allows a variance when, because of a special condition of the
property, literally enforcing the ordinance would cause unnecessary
hardship.3 3 2 In contrast, many of the inclusionary ordinances that permit waivers allow them if the ordinance would cause a taking of some
kind. 333 This suggests that cities (or city attorneys) are not convinced
that inclusionary zoning is constitutional and wish to create an escape
valve. The difficulty is that the waiver provision draws attention to that
uncertain status.
A hardship provision similar to the usual variance procedure
might be the best compromise, allowing a developer to request a variance based on hardship, not "takings." In the case of a facial challenge, it would allow a city to argue that the ability to apply for a
variance would correct any unconstitutional application. But by relying on the standards commonly used in zoning ordinances, it would
strengthen the argument that these are land use ordinances, not exactions, and would not identify inclusionary ordinances as having constitutional question marks.
4.

Eliminate Conflicts with Rent Control Laws

The experiences in California and Colorado suggests that cities
contemplating inclusionary ordinances should carefully research the
applicable rent control laws to avoid unexpected conflicts. One strategy is to assume that rent control laws do not apply to inclusionary
zoning. In that case, findings should be carefully drawn (and not pro
forma) to support the contention that these are land use laws primarily-not rent control laws. The second strategy is to draft the ordinance to avoid those conflicts. For example, in California cities can
avoid conflicts with the Costa-Hawkins Act by requiring the same percentage of affordable housing as needed for a density bonus under
334
the state Density Bonus law.
In addition, two provisions will help avoid an unconstitutionalapplication. First, units need to remain affordable over a period of years
(at least twenty, and ideally much longer) to ensure that the ordinance "substantially advances" its goal of creating affordable housing
332. See Mandelker, supra note 2, § 6.41 at 250.
333. See, e.g., NAPA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 15.94.080(A) (1999) (permitting a complete
waiver if the developer can demonstrate no nexus between the inclusionary ordinance and
the impacts of his project); SACRAMENTO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 17.190.130 (2001) (allowing a

developer to request a determination that the inclusionary ordinance is a taking); BouLDER, COLO. REV. CODE § 9-6.5-11 (2000) (permitting a developer to apply for an adjustment

on the basis that the requirements constitute a taking).
334. See supra notes 293-94 and accompanying text.
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and does not create "premium pricing" for the first buyer.3 35 Second, 336 cities may want to consider some provision for review of future

rents should unusual conditions result in rent limitations that do not
result in a fair return.

Conclusion
This Comment has explored the policy basis for inclusionary
housing, the unanswered legal questions, the impact of City of Napa,
and strategies for drafting a defensible ordinance. Inclusionary zoning
remains one of the few mechanisms that local agencies can use to
create affordable housing in the absence of federal and state housing
subsidies. Where it is coupled with a significant density bonus, as in
Montgomery County, Maryland, it is a powerful tool to increase both
affordability and the overall housing supply. However, even as usually
implemented-in middle-class suburban communities more committed to low density than to affordable housing-it acts as a correction
to exclusionary land policies that have artificially inflated land and
house values and ensures that at least some affordable housing remains in those communities.
Although City of Napa was a case of first impression, in some ways
it merely confirmed existing law. The Nollan/Dolan test was not expanded beyond conditions requiring dedications of property and development fees individually negotiated between developers and
government. It would have been very big news for cities and property
owners had the California courts or the United States Supreme Court
accepted the HBA's definition of an exaction. Instead, California's
First District Court of Appeal agreed that the ordinance should be
treated like a typical land use ordinance and analyzed under the deferential Agins standard. Agencies can continue to use one of their
most effective methods for creating affordable housing with more
confidence that what they are doing is constitutionally sound.
Finally, although cities argue that inclusionary ordinances are not
exactions, the ordinances as drafted often contradict this assertion.
Typically, in-lieu fees may be substituted for on-site units (implying
that the units are equivalent to an impact fee); waivers can be granted
if the ordinance creates a taking (implying that the drafters think this
is a possibility); and the requirements can be met in a multitude of
different ways (implying that the city is looking for a commodity, i.e.,
335.
336.

See supra Part IV.C.
See supra Part IV. B.
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an exaction). Ordinances can, in fact, be defensible even if they are
drafted to more closely resemble ordinary zoning ordinances, and
they will be much easier to administer.
Inclusionary zoning is thirty years old. It remains a successful
technique that should continue to create affordable housing for the
next thirty years.
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